# **1NC**

## 1

We’ll impact turn their role of the ballot

Economic engagement is distinct from diplomatic engagement

Derrick 98 (Robert, Lieutenant Colonel US Army, “ENGAGEMENT: THE NATIONS PREMIER GRAND STRATEGY, WHO'S IN CHARGE?,” 1998, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA342695>)

Economic engagement covers a wide range of programs. Financial incentives are an effective engagement tool since countries usually interact with the US when money is involved. Whether it is obtaining funding for a national program; acquiring materiel, food or medicine; or maintaining Most Favored Nation 12Status, financial aide has always been a preferred way for the US to affect the behavior of others. Diplomatic engagement ranges from recognition of sovereign states and foreign governments, to presidential visits, to all aspects of the embassy itself. The mere existence of an embassy is an engagement tool. Through official diplomatic ceremonies, informal meetings, and embassy employees living among the locals, the Department of State's presence is engagement in and of itself. Similarly, "...overseas...forces embody global military engagement. They serve as role models for militaries in emerging democracies; contribute uniquely to the stability, continuity, and flexibility that protects US interests; and are crucial to continued democratic and economic development."14 In addition to our presence overseas, our military engagement consists of a variety of military to military and political to military events. U.S. and host nation defense forces conduct combined exercises to improve cooperation and strengthen ties. Much of the peacetime efforts of the DOS and DOD are engagement. This is in the form of forward presence, regional exercises, and infrastructure construction projects. The engagement tools of three of our five instruments of our National Power: Military, Economic and Political, (Geographical and National Will being the other two), listed below in Figure 3, are a few examples of how the US uses these powers to stay engaged. Military Diplomatic Economic CJCS Exercises State Recognition Agcy for Intl Devi Depl for Trng (DFT) Presidential Visits Econ Spt Fund (ESF) Intl Mil Ed & Tr (IMET) Demarshe Fgn Mil Sales (FMS) Counterdrug Spt (CD) Treaties & Health Aid Mobile Tr Teams (MTT) Agreements

Vote negative---they make the topic “Resolved: Latin America,” explodes the topic to include anything that involves the US and a Topic country.

The plan is independently FX topical – it doesn’t mandate trade between the two nations

Limits key in the context of engagement – meaning is inherently unclear

Resnick 1 (Evan, Assistant Professor and coordinator of the United States Programme at RSIS, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, 0022197X, Spring2001, Vol. 54, Issue 2, [Ebsco](http://web.ebscohost.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/ehost/detail?sid=1b56e6b4-ade2-4052-9114-7d107fdbd019%40sessionmgr12&vid=2&hid=24&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=mth&AN=4437301))

A second problem associated with various scholarly treatments of engagement is the tendency to define the concept too broadly to be of much help to the analyst. For instance, Cha's definition of engagement as any policy whose means are "non-coercive and non-punitive" is so vague that essentially any positive sanction could be considered engagement. The definition put forth by Alastair lain Johnston and Robert Ross in their edited volume, Engaging China, is equally nebulous. According to Johnston and Ross, engagement constitutes "the use of non-coercive methods to ameliorate the non-status quo elements of a rising power's behavior."(n14) Likewise, in his work, Rogue States and US Foreign Policy, Robert Litwak defines engagement as "positive sanctions."(n15) Moreover, in their edited volume, Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, Richard Haass and Meghan O'Sullivan define engagement as "a foreign policy strategy that depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives."(n16) As policymakers possess a highly differentiated typology of alternative options in the realm of negative sanctions from which to choose--including covert action, deterrence, coercive diplomacy, containment, limited war and total war--it is only reasonable to expect that they should have a similar menu of options in the realm of positive sanctions than simply engagement. Equating engagement with positive sanctions risks lumping together a variety of discrete actions that could be analyzed by distinguishing among them and comparing them as separate policies.

Our interpretation is that “United States Federal Government should” means the debate is solely about the outcome of a policy established by governmental means

Ericson, 03 (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

This means the affirmative can only garner advantages based off of hypothetical implementation of the plan by the USFG – its best because it allows sufficient negative ground for DA links and counterplans – its also most predictable – any advantage not based on hypothetical implementation is extra topical and a voting issue

## 2

Apocalyptic terrorism is solve only by killing – any policy of disarmament is suicide

Peters Masters in IR 2004, Ralph Peters, , St. Mary's University, Texas,[1] M.A. (international relations), Penn State, Retired U.S. Army officer¶ Military analyst, Retired Lieutenant Colonel, 2004, “WHEN DEVILS WALK THE EARTH ¶ The Mentality and Roots of Terrorism, and How to Respond”, The Center For Emerging Threats and Opportunities, PDF, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/ceto/when_devils_walk_the_earth.pdf> \*\*gender edited

The “pure” practical terrorist is an idealist, sometimes very well-educated(historically, secular universities have been excellent recruiting grounds for terrorists who want to force improvement upon the world). While it may seem counter-intuitive, the apocalyptic, religious terrorist tends to be recruited from the ranks of the fearful and threatened, from among the worried, not the confident; he is a coward in the face of life, if not in the face of death (this is absolutely applicable to the key operatives of the September 11th, 2001, plot).Despite the media-driven image of Islamic terrorists representing hordes of the Faithful, apocalyptic terrorists, such as the members of al Qa’eda, tend to act out of intensely-personal disaffection and a sense of alienation from social norms, while the practical terrorist is more apt to feel driven by group grievances (though he, too, is rarely a “successful” member of society before his conversion to terror). The apocalyptic terrorist “wants out,” while the practical terrorist wants “back in,” although on much-improved terms of his own dictation (another aspect of this psychology is that practical terrorists, even when involved in international movements, prefer to focus on the locale of their personal grievances, while apocalyptic terrorists view the greater world as their enemy and are far more likely to transpose blame from their own societies onto other cultures).While both types find comfort—a home and brotherhood—in the terrorist organization, the practical terrorist imagines himself as a representative of his people, while the apocalyptic terrorist sees himself as chosen and apart, despite his occasional rhetoric about protecting the masses adhering to his faith. The practical terrorist idealizes his own kind—his people--while the apocalyptic terrorist insists that only his personal ideals have any validity. The practical terrorist is impassioned and imagines that his deeds will help his brethren in the general population, while the apocalyptic terrorist is detached from compassion by his faith and only wants to punish the “sinful,” whom he finds ever more numerous as he is progressively hypnotized by the dogma that comforts him.

Except for the most cynical gunmen, practical terrorists believe that mankind can be persuaded (or forced) to regret past errors and make amends, and that reform of the masses is possible (although a certain amount of coercion may be required). But apocalyptic terrorists (such as Osama bin Laden) are merciless. Practical terrorists may see acts of retribution as a tactical means, but apocalyptic terrorists view themselves as tools of a divine and uncompromising retribution. Retribution against unbelievers, heretics and even their own brethren whose belief is less pure is the real strategic goal of apocalyptic terrorists, even when they do not fully realize it themselves or cannot articulate it. Even among average Americans, there is often a great gulf between what they consciously think they believe and the “slumbering” deeper beliefs that catalytic events awaken—such as the frank thirst for revenge felt by tens of millions of “peaceful” Americans in the wake of the events of September 11th. It is considerably less likely that a morally-crippled, obsessed, apocalyptic terrorist cocooned in an extreme religious vision will be able to articulate his real goals; we cannot know apocalyptic terrorists by their pronouncements so well as by their deeds, since much of what they say is meant to make their intentions seem more innocent or justified than they are. Often, apocalyptic terrorists are lying even to themselves. Apocalyptic terrorists are whirling in the throes of a peculiar, malignant madness, and barely know what they believe in the depths of their souls—in fact, much of their activity is an attempt to avoid recognition of the darkness within themselves, a struggle to depict themselves as(avenging) angels of light. Centuries ago, we might have said they were possessed by devils. Today, we must at least accept that they are possessed and governed by a devilish vision. The practical terrorist punishes others to force change. The religious terrorist may speak of changes he desires in this world, but his true goal is simply the punishment of others—in the largest possible numbers—as an offering to the bloodthirsty, vengeful God he has created for himself. This apocalyptic terrorist may identify himself as a Muslim or a Christian, but (S)he is closer akin to an Aztec sacrificing long lines of prisoners on an altar of blood (one of the many psychological dimensions yet to be explored in terrorist studies is the atavistic equation of bloodshed with cleansing—an all-too-literal bath of blood). No change in the world order will ever content the apocalyptic terrorist, since his (Her) actual discontents are internal to himself and no alteration in the external environment could sate his appetite for retribution against those he needs to believe are evil and guilty of causing his personal sufferings and disappointments—for such men, suicidal acts have a fulfilling logic, since only their own destruction can bring them lasting peace. Above all, they need other humans to hate while they remain alive—the only release for the profound self-hatred underlying the egotism that lets them set themselves up as God’s judges—as imitation Gods themselves—upon this earth. In theological terms, there is no greater blasphemer in any religion than the killer who appoints himself as God’s agent, or assumes a godlike right to judge entire populations for himself, but the divine mission oft he apocalyptic terrorist leaves no room for theological niceties. Pretending to defend his religion, he creates a vengeful splinter religion of his own. The health of any religious community can be gauged by the degree to which it rejects these bloody apostles of terror, and the Islamic world’s acceptance of apocalyptic terrorists as heroes is perhaps the most profound indicator of its spiritual crisis and decay. Make no mistake: The terrorist “martyrs” of September 11th, 2001, and Osama bin Laden will be remembered by Islamic historians and by generation after generation of Muslim children as great heroes in the struggle for true religion and justice—no matter what Islamic governments may say to please us, many millions of Muslims around the world felt tremendous pride in the atrocities in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania. This makes it all the more vital that the United States kill Osama bin Laden, exterminate alQa’eda, destroy the Taliban, and depose any other governments found to have supported their terrorism. If Osama bin Laden survives to thumb his nose at an “impotent superpower,” he will attract hundreds of thousands of supporters, and tens of millions more sympathizers. He is already a hero, and he must not be allowed to remain a triumphant one. An apocalyptic terrorist of the worst kind, his superficial agenda(deposing the government of Saudi Arabia, expelling U.S. troops from the Middle East, imposing Sharia law) is nothing compared to his compulsion to slaughter and destroy. Although his vision is closer to the grimmest passages of Christianity’s Book of Revelation than to anything in the Koran, Osama bin Laden has been able to convince countless Muslims that his vision is of the purest and proudest Islamic form. This should be a huge warning flag to the West about the spiritual crisis in the Islamic world. Logic of the sort cherished on campuses and in government bureaucracies does not apply. This battle is being fought within the realms of the emotions and the soul, not of the intellect. We face a situation so perverse that it is as if tens of millions of frustrated Christians decided that Kali, the Hindu Goddess of death and destruction, embodied the true teachings of Jesus Christ. We are witnessing the horrific mutation of a great world religion, and the Islamic world likely will prove the greatest breeding ground of apocalyptic terrorists in history. Small and vicious gods. The belief systems of practical terrorists are often modular; some such men can learn ,evolve, synthesize or re-align their views. But the apocalyptic terrorist cannot tolerate any debate or dissent—all divergent opinions are a direct threat to his mental house of cards. The apocalyptic terrorist embraces a totality of belief and maintains it with an ironclad resolution attained by only the most extreme—and psychotic—secular terrorists. From identifying himself as a tool of his God, he begins to assume his right to God like powers. The practical terrorist is in conflict with the existing system, but the apocalyptic terrorist sees himself as infinitely superior to it. The practical terrorist looks up at the authority he seeks to replace, but the apocalyptic terrorist looks down on the humankind he despises. Despise enforcing rigorous discipline within the terrorist organization, the practical terrorist nonetheless retains a sense of human imperfection. The religious, apocalyptic terrorist believes that those who are imperfect deserve exterminate on (in oneof terrorism’s gray area anomalies, the “secular” Nazi regime took on an essentially religious vision that embraced state terror—Hitler’s attitude toward the Jews was astonishingly similar to Osama bin Laden’s view of Jews, Christians and even secular Muslims; of course, the desire to please God or authority by slaughtering unbelievers has a long tradition in many religions, from medieval Catholicism to contemporary Hindu extremism).

Weakness invites attack – morality demands we attack them to prevent nuclear terror

Brook and Ghate 2005, Yaron Brook, MBA, University of Texas at Austin; PhD, Finance, University of Texas at Austin, executive director of the Ayn Rand Institute, and ONKAR GHATE senior fellow at the Ayn Rand Institute, doctorate in philosophy from the University of Calgary, 2005, “The Foreign Policy of Guilt”, http://www.aynrand.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=11269&news\_iv\_ctrl=1063

But we should be afraid--precisely because of Blair's and Bush's policies.¶ We face an enemy, Islamic totalitarianism, committed to our deaths. Its agents have shown an eagerness to kill indiscriminately in London, Madrid, New York and elsewhere, even at the cost of their own lives. They continually seek chemical and nuclear weapons; imagine the death toll if such devices had been used in London's subway bombings. In the face of this mounting threat, what is our response?¶ Do we proudly proclaim our unconditional right to exist? Do we resolutely affirm to eradicate power base after power base of the Islamic totalitarians, until they drop their arms, and foreign governments and civilian populations no longer have the nerve to support them?¶ No. Blair's response to the London bombings, with Bush and the other members of the G8 by his side, was, in meaning if not in explicit statement, to apologize and do penance for our existence.¶ Somehow we in the West and not the Palestinians--with their rejection of the freedoms attainable in Israel and their embrace of thugs and killers--are responsible for their degradation. Thus, we must help build them up by supplying the terrorist-sponsoring Palestinian Authority with billions in aid. And somehow we in the West and not the Africans--with their decades of tribal, collectivist and anticapitalist ideas--are responsible for their poverty. Thus we must lift them out of their plight with $50 billion in aid. This, Blair claims, will help us "triumph over terrorism."¶ The campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq might be considered exceptions to this orgy of penance, but that would be an error. In neither war was the aim to smash the enemy. Unlike in WWII, when the Allies would flatten cities to achieve victory, the American and British armies, by explicit order, tiptoed in the Middle East. Terrorists and insurgents went free, free to return to kill our young men, because we subordinated the lives of our soldiers to concern for the enemy's well-being and civilian casualties. Our goal was not victory but, as Bush so often tells us, to bestow with our soldiers' blood an unearned gift on these people, "freedom" and "democracy," with the hope that they would then stop killing us.¶ According to Blair, our duty is to shower the globe with money. According to Bush, our duty is to shower the globe with "democracy." Taken together, the meaning of their foreign policy is clear. The West has no moral right to exist, because it is productive, prosperous and free; materially and spiritually, with its money and its soldiers' lives, the West must buy permission to exist from the rest of the world. But the rest of the world has an unquestionable right to exist, because it is unproductive, poor and unfree.¶ Until we in the West reject this monstrous moral premise, we will never have cause to feel safe.¶ What we desperately need is a leader who proclaims that the rational ideals of the West, reason, science, individual rights and capitalism, are good--that we have a moral right to exist for our own sake--that we don't owe the rest of the world anything--and that we should be admired and emulated for our virtues and accomplishments, not denounced. This leader would then demonstrate, in word and deed, that if those opposed to these ideals take up arms against us, they will be crushed.¶ Support for totalitarian Islam will wither only when the Islamic world is convinced that the West will fight--and fight aggressively. As long as the insurgents continue with their brutal acts in Iraq, unharmed by the mightiest military force in human history, as long as the citizens of London return to "normal" lives with subways exploding all around them, as long as the West continues to negotiate with Iran on nuclear weapons--as long as the West continues to appease its enemies, because it believes it has no moral right to destroy them, totalitarian Islam is emboldened.¶ It is the West's moral weakness that feeds terrorism and brings it fresh recruits. It is the prospect of success against the West, fueled by the West's apologetic response, that allows totalitarian Islam to thrive. Bush has said repeatedly, in unguarded moments, that this war is un-winnable. By his foreign policy, it is. But if the British and American people gain the self-esteem to assert our moral right to exist--with everything this entails--victory will be ours.

Nuke terror causes Extinction – turns the case – securitizing it is crucial reducing the probability of terrorism - even 1% reduction is sufficient reason to vote neg – this card is long but an independent net benefit to our framing

Saga Foundation 2008, (Analyzes global existential risk – think tank, 2008, “Nuclear Terrorism: Local Effects, Global Consequences”, http://www.sagafoundation.org/SagaFoundationWhitePaperSAGAMARK7282008.pdf

Nuclear terrorism represents the most serious existential threat to the ¶ security of the United States and the world. Yet the issue has all but disappeared ¶ from view. A number of reasons underlie the lack of discussion of nuclear ¶ terrorism in the 2008 presidential campaign. It may be it has yet to draw focused ¶ attention because of the absence of any further terror attacks on the U.S. ¶ homeland since 9/11. It may be due to a belief in some quarters that a nuclear ¶ act of terrorism is a remote possibility because of the inherent difficulty of ¶ surreptitiously assembling or acquiring a nuclear weapon. And it may be that ¶ since we agree it’s a serious problem, what is there to argue about, the ¶ assumption being we must be doing everything possible to prevent it. During the ¶ 2004 presidential campaign, both President Bush and Senator John Kerry said ¶ that nuclear terrorism was the leading threat to national security. Little has ¶ changed since, except that the public’s focus has turned elsewhere. This lack of ¶ controversy is a pronounced obstacle confronting those seeking to energize the ¶ issue. Just about everyone agrees: an act of nuclear terror would be a terrible ¶ thing; it would devastate the community attacked and psychologically terrorize ¶ the rest of the nation. But there has been relatively little public and media 2¶ attention to this threat – a threat that could profoundly and permanently change ¶ our way of life. ¶ The basic features of a nuclear terrorist attack are so self-evident that very ¶ little time and energy has been put into understanding just how terrible such an ¶ attack would be. Much good work has been done, but much more needs to be ¶ done in this area to ensure that the public understands the stakes involved in the ¶ effort to prevent nuclear terrorism. Understanding the dynamics of both an act of ¶ nuclear terrorism and its likely aftermath drives home the conclusion that a ¶ nuclear terrorist attack anywhere will affect everyone everywhere. In this report, ¶ the Saga Foundation seeks to redress the shortcomings in the dialogue about ¶ nuclear terrorism and consider in some detail the possible consequences and ¶ aftershocks – physical, psychological, economic – that would flow from the ¶ detonation of a nuclear weapon in an American city. A better understanding of ¶ these likely consequences, we believe, will help energize the political community, ¶ from the grass roots to our national leaders, to take the steps necessary to ¶ seriously and comprehensively address this threat. While Saga strongly ¶ advocates further research, including comprehensive war-game exercises into ¶ the dynamics of a nuclear terrorist attack, our analysis and research already in ¶ existence enable us to reach a basic understanding of the widespread impact of ¶ an attack in a single location. ¶ Key Finding 3¶ Our principal conclusion is that the economic aftershocks flowing not only ¶ from a nuclear terrorist attack itself but from a predictable set of decisions a U.S. ¶ president could be expected to make in the wake of such an attack would inflict ¶ extraordinary economic damage on the nation stretching far beyond the point of ¶ attack. Beyond responding with aid to the scene of an attack, the first order of ¶ business for a president following a nuclear terrorist strike would be to determine ¶ if another strike was about to occur and to do everything possible to prevent it. ¶ Virtually all the important presidential decisions in the wake of the September 11 ¶ attacks – the suspension of all air travel; mandates to secure cockpit doors; the ¶ redesign of airport security; the dispatch of U.S. forces to Afghanistan; the ¶ institution of surveillance of terror suspects – were designed to prevent follow-on ¶ attacks. Punishing the aggressors was an important but secondary issue. In a ¶ nuclear attack scenario, presidential decisions revolving around this imperative ¶ would be taken regardless of whether another attack was planned or actually ¶ took place. Among the post-attack presidential decisions we deem highly likely: ¶ • Shutdown of freight commerce/border closures. The likelihood that a ¶ nuclear weapon would be clandestinely brought into our country would in ¶ all likelihood prompt a national initiative to seal the borders and freeze and ¶ search virtually all freight conveyances, whether trucks, ships or planes, ¶ delivering a major shock to the economy and bringing home to the entire ¶ populace the enormity of what has occurred, as stocks of basic supplies ¶ vanished almost overnight. 4¶ • Retaliation. The president would be under enormous pressure to respond ¶ swiftly and forcefully to such an attack, even if the geographic or geopolitical point of origin was uncertain. The science of ‘nuclear forensics,’ ¶ which can enable specialists to identify the source of nuclear material ¶ used in a bomb even post-explosion, would provide some key clues as to ¶ the source of the attack. As a consequence, there would be tremendous ¶ pressure to hold someone—terror groups and their state sponsors—¶ responsible, engendering immediate and forceful retaliation. ¶ • Suspension of civil liberties. Extraordinary concern about further ¶ nuclear attacks following an initial attack would drive a series of decisions ¶ restricting freedom of movement and conferring extraordinary powers on ¶ government agencies charged with preventing another strike. ¶ The point cannot be emphasized enough: Not the attack itself but the fear¶ of a follow-on attack and the response to that fear would drive a set of decisions ¶ that would almost certainly bring all freight traffic to a halt, shut down the nation’s ¶ ports, empty the nation’s grocery shelves, and bring most manufacturing to a ¶ virtual standstill. Even if this shut-down were temporary, our economic system of ¶ “just-in-time inventory” would mean that basic staples would very quickly become ¶ unavailable, delivering a psychological blow to the populace and a devastating ¶ shock to national and international financial markets. We live with the possibility ¶ of a nuclear terrorist attack today, but the possibility of a future attack once the 5¶ first attack occurred would be deemed so much greater as to create an entirely ¶ new reality in terms of the political and economic functioning of the nation. ¶ Although preparation for disaster is an important part of any homeland ¶ security plan, we contend that the point of studying and understanding the full ¶ range of consequences of an act of nuclear terrorism is to motivate the ¶ government and the people to ensure that such an attack never happens. We are ¶ not seeking a better civil defense plan or trying to revive a “duck and cover” ¶ strategy. We are trying to clearly lay out the consequences of failure so that the ¶ necessary steps are taken with the necessary energy and urgency. ¶ New Nuclear Danger ¶ Nearly two decades after the end of the Cold War, America needs a ¶ refresher course in the dangers of nuclear weapons. Jonathan Schell, author of ¶ The Seventh Decade: The New Shape of Nuclear Danger, pointed out in a recent ¶ interview that “People thought that when the Cold War ended, nuclear danger ¶ ended, too. … We have a whole generation having grown up without having ¶ been told the ABCs of this issue.” That the Cold War-era nuclear scenario – a life ¶ ending spasm of attack and counter-attack that would entomb the globe in a ¶ nuclear firestorm – has faded with the easing of superpower rivalry in no way has ¶ eliminated the nuclear threat from our world. The threat remains, but changed or ¶ transformed. This is because of the rise of an extremely violent form of terrorism, ¶ whether operating independently or with clandestine state sponsorship, which 6¶ may not fall subject to the traditional strictures of deterrence, has removed the ¶ largest historical barriers to nuclear attack. ¶ Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States wanted to unleash their ¶ nuclear weapons on the other; they were prepared to do so in the extremely ¶ unlikely event that it became necessary, and both sides were well aware that an ¶ attack by one side on the other would bring about a certain and devastating ¶ response. In his book, At the Abyss, former Secretary of the Air Force Thomas C. ¶ Reed writes of the impact the Cuban missile crisis had on U.S. and Soviet ¶ leaders who contemplated the catastrophe that could have resulted from a ¶ nuclear exchange. From that point forward, according to Reed, “the possibility of ¶ nuclear war changed from a policy option to a dreaded disaster.” ¶ In contrast, terror groups have made it clear they see no moral constraint ¶ to using such weapons against the ‘infidel’ West in general and the United States ¶ in particular. As a shadowy, non-state entity, a terror group would not have to ¶ worry about massive retaliation, since there is little in the way of terrorist ¶ infrastructure, military might or population to retaliate against. This invulnerability ¶ to traditional deterrence might change should we be able to determine that a ¶ state sponsor provided the nuclear material or weapon, or otherwise supported a ¶ terrorist nuclear attack. But a nation so implicated could always claim such ¶ weapons were stolen or lost, undermining the justification for a massive U.S. and ¶ allied military response. Proof might be very difficult to establish. 7¶ The major constraint confronting terror groups is access to nuclear ¶ weapons themselves. The standard view that a terrorist group would be hard ¶ pressed to steal an intact nuclear weapon may need to be revisited in light of the ¶ incident last year in which a half dozen U.S. thermonuclear weapons were ¶ inadvertently strapped to the wings of an Air Force B-52 bomber and flown from ¶ North Dakota to Louisiana. An internal Pentagon investigation concluded that Air ¶ Force security systems protecting the nuclear weapons under its guardianship ¶ need to be significantly enhanced. In response, Defense Secretary Robert Gates ¶ ordered a top-to-bottom revamping of nuclear weapons security procedures and, ¶ eventually, replaced the Air Force senior leadership. Overseas, there are ¶ concerns about hundreds of small, easily transportable tactical nuclear weapons ¶ deployed by the Soviet Union and never fully accounted for since the end of the ¶ Cold War. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is seen as particularly vulnerable to the ¶ possibility of theft or diversion through an insider job. ¶ Of substantially greater concern is the possibility that terrorists could ¶ obtain through theft, bribery or diversion a critical mass of plutonium or highly ¶ enriched uranium – most likely the former – and use the material to fashion a ¶ crude but devastating homemade nuclear weapon. Research reactors in dozens ¶ of countries around the world, on hospital grounds and university campuses with ¶ inadequate security, use highly enriched uranium which, if stolen, would be safe ¶ for terrorists to transport and difficult for security officials to find because it puts ¶ off almost no radioactive signal. 8¶ The experts continue to debate the question of how easy it would be for a ¶ terror group, once it obtained this fissile material, to engineer a nuclear weapon. ¶ Some say it would be relatively easy, citing the simple “gun type” bomb used in ¶ the U.S. attack on Hiroshima in August 1945. The weapon design was sufficiently ¶ simple and reliable that it was used in the attack without having been tested. The ¶ more complex “implosion type” bomb dropped on Nagasaki used a design tested ¶ in the New Mexico desert earlier that year. ¶ There is also a debate about the chances of a so-called rogue state ¶ turning over a complete nuclear weapon to a terror group. Some consider this ¶ possibility highly unlikely, pointing out that these states seek nuclear weapons for ¶ their own power and prestige, and as a deterrent to more powerful adversaries. ¶ Leaders of these states would be unlikely to give up control of a nuclear weapon ¶ to an unpredictable terror group whose use of it in an attack might hold dire ¶ consequences for the state that provided the weapon. Nevertheless, the ¶ possibility of such a deliberate or unauthorized diversion, or of the theft of a ¶ complete weapon through an ‘inside job’ in a state where security procedures are ¶ more lax than in the United States and Russia, cannot be ruled out. ¶ In June 2008, new concern about the availability of bomb designs ¶ surfaced when a report by David Albright of the Institute for Science and ¶ International Security disclosed that U.S. and allied intelligence officials had ¶ traced computerized blueprints of a compact, portable nuclear weapon to the ¶ nuclear technology-smuggling network of Pakistan’s Abdul Qadeer Khan, 9¶ designer of Pakistan’s nuclear weapon and leader – until his arrest – of a black ¶ market arms technology smuggling operation. The blueprints have been traced to ¶ the computers of Khan allies in Switzerland, Dubai, Malaysia and Thailand, and ¶ an investigation continues to determine who may have received copies of these ¶ weapons designs. Because of their small size, the weapons are regarded as ¶ highly desirable for terrorists. ¶ Albright told the Associated Press that the design found on the Khan ¶ network’s computers had previously been thought to be the exclusive province of ¶ nuclear powers. The intelligence discoveries raise the possibility that a ¶ sophisticated weapons design was leaked to unknown parties. “It is a very ¶ different category of information, and it's very dangerous," Albright told AP. ¶ “There are no other designs out there. There is very little information of this ¶ quality out there outside of the nuclear weapons states.” The storage of this ¶ bomb design in easily distributed computer files raises a particular concern about ¶ whether and with whom these blueprints were shared. ¶ The relative security of U.S. nuclear material has led experts to conclude ¶ that the most likely scenario for a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States ¶ would be for the weapon, or the weapon components, to be smuggled in to the ¶ United States from overseas. The International Atomic Energy Agency reports ¶ that since 1993 there have been some 1,900 nuclear-related smuggling ¶ incidents. Of those, about 19 involved attempts to smuggle fissile material that ¶ could be used to fashion a nuclear weapon or a radiation dispersion device. That 10¶ is one reason behind the growing concern about the security of U.S. ports and it ¶ was the reason behind Rand’s decision to use the port of Long Beach, Calif., as ¶ the setting for a 2004 war game exercise posing a hypothetical terrorist nuclear ¶ weapon exploding in a shipping container at dockside. To date, this report ¶ represents the most detailed publicly available examination of the consequences ¶ – physical, psychological, economic – of a terrorist nuclear attack. But Rand itself ¶ acknowledged that much more needs to be done: ¶ A devastating attack would send social and economic aftershocks ¶ cascading through multiple sectors long after the initial strike was over. ¶ While much analysis has been done on the possible short-term effects of ¶ an attack of this magnitude, no work has investigated longer-term ¶ implications. Exploratory efforts to do so are needed. Over time, the ¶ economic effects of the catastrophe are likely to spread far beyond the ¶ initial attack, reaching a nationwide and even international scale. ¶ Dislocation would face two particularly difficult challenges: keeping the ¶ global shipping supply chain operating and restoring orderly economic ¶ relationships. ¶ Rand’s Charles Meade, who participated in the Long Beach scenario ¶ study, strongly urges the next administration to launch a detailed study of what ¶ he calls the “system-wide impacts” of nuclear terrorism. “The problem is large ¶ and uncertain,” Meade says, “and it’s not clear who has ownership over finding a ¶ solution.” ¶ Life and Death at Ground Zero ¶ A great deal of work has been done on the probable impact of a terrorist ¶ attack involving a nuclear weapon with an explosive force of about ten kilotons, 11¶ or somewhat less than that of the Hiroshima bomb. Most assume that a terrorist ¶ nuclear weapon would be detonated at ground level. The good news in such a ¶ scenario is that the interference of buildings and terrain would reduce the ¶ diameter of the area of total devastation compared to an air-burst weapon of the ¶ kind used on Japan in World War II and posited for military attacks on population ¶ centers ever since. The bad news is that a ground-level detonation would kick up ¶ an enormous amount of dust and debris irradiated by the blast, greatly increasing ¶ the amount of fallout resulting from the explosion. Much discussion has focused ¶ on port inspections and on solving the difficult technical problem of how to ¶ automate the scanning of all incoming cargo, since today less than 10 percent of ¶ cargo arriving on U.S. shores is physically inspected or electronically scanned. ¶ The U.S. Department of Energy has devoted much effort to its Nuclear ¶ Emergency Support Teams, or NEST, trained to arrive rapidly at the scene of a ¶ nuclear threat event, such as the discovery of a smuggled nuclear weapon. While ¶ we support these efforts, it is important to understand that once a nuclear ¶ weapon arrives on U.S. shores, it can devastate a city without the cargo even ¶ leaving the ship or passing through inspection. In the Long Beach scenario ¶ performed by Rand, the war game posited that inspectors had searched and ¶ discovered a terrorist nuclear device aboard a container ship, but the weapon ¶ detonated before it could be disarmed. ¶ A number of organizations and individual experts have studied the likely ¶ impact of a nuclear detonation on an American City. The scenarios vary in their 12¶ particulars. Harvard Professor Graham Allison described blast effects of a 10 ¶ kiloton device, somewhat smaller in explosive force than the bomb dropped on ¶ Hiroshima, on several U.S. cities. Rand’s Long Beach scenario posited the same ¶ size bomb. Former Senator Sam Nunn has described the impact of an attack on ¶ New York’s financial district. The University of Georgia examined the effects of a ¶ 20 kiloton bomb on New York, Chicago, Washington and Atlanta. The Pacific ¶ Northwest National Laboratory studied the effects of a 13 kiloton device. A ¶ private group called the Atomic Archive studied effects of much larger nuclear ¶ weapons. All of the studies were depressingly similar in their descriptions of ¶ catastrophic destruction and immediate fatalities running into the tens of ¶ thousands and beyond. Here, based on this and other research, is a rough ¶ sketch of the findings: ¶ Midtown Manhattan: A ten kiloton weapon detonated in Times Square ¶ would devastate much of midtown Manhattan, including the theater district, ¶ Grand Central Station, Rockefeller Center, Carnegie Hall, the Empire State ¶ Building and Madison Square Garden. ¶ Wall Street: Had the 9/11 terrorists detonated a nuclear weapon instead ¶ of crashing airplanes into the World Trade Center, Lower Manhattan and the ¶ entire financial district would have been reduced to ash and rubble, according to ¶ former Senator Nunn, head of the Nuclear Threat Initiative. Survivors would be ¶ without clean water, shelter, or safe food. 13¶ San Francisco: A bomb detonated in Union Square would vaporize ¶ buildings as far as the Museum of Modern Art and would devastate with fire and ¶ destruction sections of the city including the Transamerica Building, Nob Hill, Coit ¶ Tower and the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge, according to Allison’s ¶ analysis. ¶ San Jose: A bomb detonated in or near this city would devastate much of ¶ the physical infrastructure and plant floor space of Silicon Valley, one of the main ¶ engines of the U.S. economy, to say nothing of the human devastation wrought ¶ in one of the most densely populated areas of the country. ¶ Sacramento, Calif.: An attack in the area of the levees along the ¶ Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta could compromise the system that supplies ¶ fresh water to most of Northern California. ¶ Long Beach, Calif.: Rand, in its scenario study, estimated that 5,000 ¶ people would be killed immediately by the blast and that as many as 100,000 ¶ fatalities could result from fallout. Destruction of the power grid in the area would ¶ lead to widespread blackouts in the Los Angeles region. The local health care ¶ system would collapse due to damage, the overwhelming number of injured, and ¶ government-mandated evacuations. ¶ Washington, D.C.: A bomb going off at the Smithsonian Institution would ¶ destroy the White House and reduce the U.S. Capitol and Supreme Court to ¶ rubble. U.S. government officials who survived the attack would have to relocate ¶ to emergency government centers at pre-designated sites where deliberation and 14¶ decision-making could continue. Within a two-mile diameter circle of a nuclear ¶ detonation – a distance the length of the Washington Mall – little could be done. ¶ For those further away, the urge to evacuate immediately would be ¶ overwhelming, even though this might be a fatal choice, since radioactive fallout ¶ would be most intense in the initial hours and days after a detonation. Without a ¶ highly proactive government response plan, panic could well overwhelm the ¶ populace, they argue. ¶ Localizing these nuclear terror scenarios helps people envision and ¶ comprehend the unthinkable but it also creates a misleading perception that the ¶ damage from such an attack would be confined to the site of the attack itself. In ¶ considering these scenarios, former Senator Sam Nunn, who has worked for two ¶ decades to secure the world’s nuclear material, has observed that these groundzero narratives provide only the physical impact of nuclear terrorism. ¶ If you were trying to draw a circle to mark the overall impact of the blast – ¶ in social, economic, and security terms -- the circle would be the equator ¶ itself. No part of the planet would escape the impact. People everywhere ¶ would fear another blast. Travel, international trade, capital flows, ¶ commerce would initially stop, and many freedoms we have come to take ¶ for granted would quickly be eroded in the name of security. The ¶ confidence of America and the world would be shaken to the core. ¶ Economic Chain Reaction ¶ Echoing the nuclear chain reaction that sets off an atomic explosion, an ¶ economic chain reaction would follow a nuclear terrorist attack. In the immediate ¶ aftermath there would be staggering clean-up costs that would dwarf the costs ¶ involved in the post-9/11 clean-up. The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 15¶ study of post-attack economic impact calculated not only physical clean-up but ¶ medical care for the wounded, the cost of lost economic activity due to ¶ destruction of businesses and to fatalities, evacuation, decontamination and ¶ reconstruction costs, and impacts to the affected region such as lost tourism ¶ revenue. The study concluded that a 13 kiloton attack on New York City would ¶ bring total costs approaching the entire U.S. gross domestic product for 2005. ¶ And the impacts would extend far beyond the region hit in an attack. The precise ¶ profile of this economic impact would depend on the attack profile and would ¶ surely involve elements that are impossible to predict. Through war-gaming and ¶ the exploration of likely decisions that would follow such an attack, however, we ¶ can arrive at an approximate understanding of what might be in store for the ¶ United States and world economies. The Saga Foundation strongly urges ¶ detailed government-funded research into this question and offers this postattack profile to stimulate discussion and to encourage more effective preventive ¶ government measures. ¶ Assurance: The first order of business for the president would be to assure the ¶ public that everything that can be done to aid the victims of the attack is being ¶ done and that everything that can be done to prevent another attack will be done. ¶ Action: Immediate post-attack security measures to prevent a potential second ¶ nuclear terrorist attack could prompt the president to order closing of all U.S. ¶ ports and borders, inspection of all inbound foreign cargo, freeze and inspection 16¶ of most freight rail and truck cargo, and mobilization of all national, state and ¶ local security personnel to assist with this massive effort. ¶ Mitigation: The shock to the economy of even a short-term freeze on commerce ¶ would bring about a temporary halt to most if not all manufacturing and would ¶ quickly empty shelves across the country of basic food supplies and other life ¶ necessities. This would then require rapid mitigation moves to enable the ¶ resumption of production and very limited importation under close inspection ¶ scrutiny. ¶ Curfews: The need to fully mobilize to respond to the scene of the attack and to ¶ take all steps necessary to avert a follow-on attack would likely require the ¶ imposition of curfews on air and ground transportation, at least for the initial days ¶ and weeks following the attack. Such restrictions would impose an economic cost ¶ of their own, beyond the cost of temporarily shutting down normal commerce. ¶ Retaliation: A tidal wave of national anger would flow from a terrorist nuclear ¶ attack, a reaction easily understandable but also dangerous in the pressure it ¶ would impose on decision-makers to take rash and possibly counterproductive ¶ action. Even if a terror group claimed responsibility for the attack, some effort ¶ would be required to determine its origin and rule out hoax claims. A significant ¶ part of this effort would entail nuclear forensics to determine the geographic ¶ origin of the fissile material used in the attack. Connected to this effort would be a ¶ sweeping effort by the U.S. National Command Authority to determine if a foreign ¶ government directed and aided the responsible group in mounting the attack. 17¶ Any firm conclusions along these lines would bring about swift and devastating ¶ retaliation. It is also likely that the president would be under overwhelming ¶ domestic pressure to respond even in the absence of absolute certainty as to ¶ responsibility for the attack. ¶ State of War: A nuclear terrorist attack would be of such magnitude as to do ¶ something that did not occur in the wake of 9/11 – place the country on an ¶ unambiguous war footing. The last time such a society-wide mobilization ¶ occurred was World War II. Today, a sudden shift to society-wide mobilization ¶ would impose major shocks on the economy whose impact would be difficult to ¶ predict. ¶ Civil Liberties: Reaction to a terrorist nuclear attack and fear of further such ¶ attacks would be so strong as to bring about pressure to impose restrictions on ¶ civil liberties of such magnitude as to potentially undermine our constitutional ¶ system of government. Unrestricted domestic surveillance, incarceration of ¶ certain individuals without charge, summary deportation of persons of concern, ¶ exercise of extraordinary presidential powers and the eclipse of judicial and ¶ congressional power would be among the possible shifts in the wake of such an ¶ attack, and a key challenge for the government and the people would be to ¶ ensure that such shifts as occurred did not become permanent. ¶ Market Stabilization: The shock to U.S. and global industrial and financial ¶ markets along with resulting off-the-scale job losses and plummeting investor ¶ confidence would require urgent presidential action even though the White 18¶ House would be confronted with the reality that its own post-attack actions were ¶ contributing to the severity of these economic problems. Government intervention ¶ in the national economy not seen since the Great Depression and World War II ¶ would likely be necessary, though it is unclear whether even dramatic ¶ government action could stand up to the enormous downward economic ¶ pressures brought on by a nuclear terrorist attack and its aftermath. ¶ Nuclear Terrorism: How Likely? ¶ Efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism have been largely non-controversial in ¶ the sense few if anyone could object to taking reasonable steps to prevent such ¶ a catastrophe. But these efforts, while laudable in markedly improving the ¶ security of a great deal of nuclear material worldwide, particularly in the former ¶ Soviet Union, have lacked a sense of urgency and a priority level commensurate ¶ with the threat. ¶ In a June 2008 speech at the Washington Institute, Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, ¶ the chief of intelligence at the U.S. Department of Energy, said, “We must take ¶ urgent action to scoop up any nuclear material outside state control before ¶ terrorists do.” Mowatt-Larssen said that the “continuing instances of trafficking in ¶ nuclear materials means we collectively have not done enough to keep material ¶ out of the hands of terrorists. … We must urgently intensify efforts to acquire any ¶ materials that may be for sale on the illicit nuclear market.” 19¶ One reason underlying this lack of urgency is that there are some who ¶ believe that the possibility of a terrorist nuclear attack is extremely remote and ¶ who therefore see other government endeavors, whether in the homeland ¶ security arena or elsewhere, as more important. There are many ways to look at ¶ this issue, and it is an unavoidable fact that the statistical chances of a nuclear ¶ terrorist attack occurring can only be conjectured. But this much seems ¶ defensible: a terrorist or state-sponsored terrorist nuclear attack may be a ¶ statistically remote possibility, but it seems clear that it is the most likely nuclear¶ threat that faces us today, given the end of Cold War tensions and the everpresent threat of massive retaliation as a barrier to nuclear attacks by adversary ¶ states. Billionaire investor Warren Buffett, who is handy with numbers, posits that ¶ if the probability of something catastrophic happening is 10 percent per year, that ¶ means that over a 50-year period it has a 99-and-a-half percent chance of ¶ happening. If society can reduce a threat to a 1 percent chance per year, then ¶ over that same half century there is a 60 percent chance of avoiding disaster.¶ esearch commissioned by the Saga Foundation indicates that the public ¶ does not share the view of those specialists who consider an act of nuclear ¶ terrorism to be unlikely. Focus group research by Saga indicates that people are, ¶ in some ways, more worried about nuclear terrorism than they are about the ¶ state of the U.S. economy. Nuclear terrorism would deliver a sudden, unexpected ¶ and intense shock to the nation. At the same time, these participants in Saga’s ¶ research indicated they are pessimistic about government’s ability to succeed in 20¶ mounting a comprehensive defense of the homeland, whether through border ¶ security or efforts to directly combat terror groups. They also understand that the ¶ economic shocks, even to localities far from the scene of an attack, would be ¶ profound and personal, as shocks to the supply of basic necessities combined ¶ with macro-economic impacts such as runaway inflation touched individual lives ¶ profoundly. In fashioning a more robust response to the threat of nuclear ¶ terrorism, it will be necessary to take on this pessimism, to expand programs ¶ already in place that are showing results and to design new programs that will ¶ increase confidence in the ability to thwart terror groups from obtaining these ¶ deadly weapons and put an end to state-run nuclear programs that are a danger ¶ to our security. ¶ While we cannot precisely calculate the probability of an act of nuclear ¶ terrorism, we can weigh some of the forces working toward and against this ¶ threat. Among the forces working against nuclear terrorism: ¶ • The difficulty of obtaining fissile material ¶ • The difficulty of a non-state group engineering a workable nuclear ¶ weapon ¶ • Increasing security measures to protect or eliminate existing fissile ¶ material worldwide, particularly in the former Soviet Union ¶ • Improved and expanded homeland security programs ¶ • Progress in the ongoing war on terror and continuing efforts to ¶ weaken and degrade terror groups and their terror masters 21¶ • Indications, admittedly ambiguous, suggesting that even for a ¶ radically violent terrorist group, the use of a nuclear weapon against ¶ hundreds of thousands of civilians might be considered ¶ counterproductive to the terrorist movement and therefore beyond ¶ the pale. ¶ Forces pushing us toward the possibility of an act of nuclear terror include: ¶ • A stated declaration by jihadist elements that obtaining nuclear ¶ capability is a religious duty for Islamists and clerical findings that ¶ use of such a weapon against the enemies of Islam could be ¶ justified ¶ • Continuing gaps in security of some nuclear material, particularly at ¶ research reactors ¶ • The availability of rudimentary nuclear weapon designs through ¶ open sources, growing concern that more sophisticated designs ¶ may have become available on the black market, and the possible ¶ transfer or sale of such weapons or technology directly from ¶ nuclear armed states to terror groups ¶ • Ready access by radical groups to large funding sources in the ¶ Middle East, enhanced by the rapid rise in the price of oil ¶ • Continued gaps in port and border security, both at home and ¶ abroad, exemplified by the continuing easy flow of illegal people ¶ and drugs into the United States 22¶ • The ‘needle in a haystack’ difficulty of tracking down and seizing ¶ nuclear material once it has been stolen or diverted ¶ • Growing pressure toward the proliferation of nuclear weapons, ¶ bringing with it the increased chance of nuclear material theft, sale ¶ or diversion ¶ • The unworkability of traditional deterrent models against terror ¶ groups contemplating a nuclear attack. ¶ These lists are only partial but, on balance, suggest an overall tilt in favor ¶ of the serious possibility that an act of nuclear terrorism could occur. ¶ Motivating a Response ¶ That threat of a major nuclear exchange between the United States and ¶ the former Soviet Union receded with the end of the Cold War. In its place has ¶ arisen the threat of nuclear terrorism. It is true that the physical destruction ¶ wrought by a single terrorist nuclear attack would pale in comparison to a ¶ massive nuclear exchange. But it is also true that a terrorist nuclear attack is a ¶ more probable event than the kind of global nuclear war that so concerned ¶ America during the 1980’s. The possibility of a terrorist nuclear attack is an ¶ underlying motivating factor for much of what the U.S. government is doing ¶ around the world. Whether the issue is reducing U.S. and Russian nuclear ¶ arsenals, preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, securing fissile ¶ material worldwide, converting weapons-grade uranium to commercial-grade 23¶ uranium, collecting intelligence on terrorism and waging war on terror groups and ¶ their allied state sponsors, adopting divestment measures, instituting new ¶ maritime and port security codes, implementing cooperative efforts with the ¶ Proliferation Security Initiative, or adopting the US and Russian led counter ¶ nuclear terrorism cooperative efforts – all of these endeavors have as an ¶ underlying element the imperative of preventing or reducing the chances of ¶ nuclear terrorism. But the goal – preventing nuclear terror – has not been put ¶ sufficiently ‘up front’ so that the benefit of these and other policy endeavors is ¶ clear to the public.¶As demonstrated in this report, the impacts of an act of nuclear terrorism ¶ would be catastrophic and not confined to the area of attack. Our preventive ¶ efforts, therefore, must be comprehensive. Countering the threat of nuclear ¶ terrorism requires combining elements of “soft power” such as arms control, ¶ sanctions, securing nuclear material and border security, with “hard power” such ¶ as a credible threats of force, interdicting nuclear smuggling, pressure on ¶ proliferators, continued improvements to missile defense technology, and ¶ offensive action against foreign terrorist elements. Key elements of our efforts ¶ must include: ¶ An overseas outlook ¶ • Keeping terrorist nuclear material off our shores is vital. Once a weapon ¶ enters the country we are in a needle-in-a-haystack situation. ¶ • Within 24 hours of the arrival of a container ship at the U.S. port of ¶ Charleston, S.C., for example, a smuggled nuclear weapon, hauled by 24¶ truck, could be anywhere in the eastern U.S. as far west as Omaha, ¶ Nebraska. ¶ • Key elements of the strategy must be foreign-oriented: securing nuclear ¶ material; divestment; deterring state sponsors of terrorism; arms control; ¶ interdicting nuclear smuggling; tracking terrorist financing; law ¶ enforcement. ¶ • Work to secure foreign ports, airfields and borders to prevent terrorist ¶ nuclear weapon from ever reaching our shores. Securing overseas ports ¶ is just as important to our security as is securing our own ports. ¶ Multi-pronged strategies are required. ¶ • Old political models of left/right no longer apply. The old pattern of arms ¶ controllers on one side and weapons advocates on the other no longer fits ¶ the global security picture, if it ever did. ¶ • International cooperation is key. Saga’s research shows that the public is ¶ not entirely convinced of this point, so policymakers must do better in ¶ articulating the need for international cooperation, and the benefits flowing ¶ from that cooperation. ¶ • Nunn-Lugar efforts to secure former Soviet nuclear material, and “loose ¶ nukes” in other nations, must be accelerated. ¶ • Use of force, such as the Israeli strike on the secret Syrian nuclear ¶ installation, must remain an option in a world with such real threats. ¶ A successor to deterrence. ¶ • The impermeability of terror groups to standard threats of retaliation ¶ requires alternatives to the old deterrence models that dominated Cold ¶ War strategies. ¶ • Proliferation and state sponsorship of terror remain critical problems, so ¶ some forms of state pressure, including credible threats of force, remain ¶ viable but will not work when applied to non-state terror groups. ¶ • Iran and North Korea are nation-state adversaries but North Korea and ¶ especially Iran have terror links. Our policies toward these countries must ¶ keep in mind not only the state-on-state issues but the potential for Iranian 25¶ or North Korean nuclear weapons development to increase the nuclear ¶ terror threat. ¶ • Al Qaeda is but one element of the global terror threat. Our strategies ¶ must take into account the threats posed by groups such as Hezbollah, ¶ Hamas, and FARC ¶ • “Nuclear forensics” – the ability to identify the source of fissile material in a ¶ detonated nuclear weapon – could become a key element of a new ¶ deterrence model that holds supplier states responsible for attacks. ¶ • Interdiction of illegal nuclear technology shipments under the Proliferation ¶ Security Initiative are a critical line of defense. ¶ Follow the money ¶ • The global Jihad community is awash in petro-dollars, disguised as ¶ charitable contributions. ¶ • Freezing of financial assets, divestment and denial of foreign banks’ ¶ access to U.S. monetary systems are extremely powerful sanctions which ¶ should be used as part of our terrorist prevention strategy. ¶ Success is achievable. Examples to date: ¶ • Take down of A. Q. Khan network and Libyan nuclear program. ¶ • Half of the former Soviet Union’s nuclear material is now secured and ¶ progress continues ¶ • Successful intercepts of nuclear technology under the Proliferation ¶ Security Initiative ¶ • The power of cooperation has been demonstrated most recently by ¶ Russia support of sanctions on Iran if the Tehran government continues ¶ with uranium enrichment ¶ . ¶ Trends of concern ¶ • Decline of ethnic Russian population bringing with it the potential for ¶ growing influence of radical Islamic elements in a country with a huge ¶ nuclear arsenal. 26¶ • Growing reports of attempts at nuclear smuggling ¶ • Is our intelligence up to the job? ¶ • Is the public sufficiently engaged? ¶ Conclusion ¶ The consensus on the seriousness of the threat of nuclear terrorism is ¶ noticeably out of sync with the laudable but, to date, insufficient response to the ¶ problem. More public attention, greater public activism, and more energetic ¶ government action are needed. This will require more funding. Understanding in ¶ the starkest terms possible the consequences of an act of nuclear terrorism is a ¶ vital part of this effort because it will help clarify in the public mind the need to ¶ respond energetically and the payoff of doing so. It is worthwhile – but not ¶ enough – to understand what a nuclear attack would do to an American city. ¶ Such an attack would require a certain set of fairly predictable presidential ¶ decisions which would, in themselves, have the potential to devastate the ¶ national and global economies despite their well-intended purpose of preventing ¶ further nuclear terrorist attacks. Much greater effort must be expended to better ¶ understand the dynamics of presidential decision-making after a nuclear terrorist ¶ attack. A well-funded government study would help leaders and the public ¶ understand in much clearer terms the full consequences of failing to neutralize ¶ the terrorist nuclear threat. These consequences go far beyond the devastation ¶ that would be cause at the scene of an attack. The purpose of a detailed study of 27¶ these consequences and the dissemination of the results to the public is not to ¶ sow panic or engage in scare-mongering; scaring ourselves to death may very ¶ well engender paralysis and a sense of helplessness. Rather, if we awaken the ¶ public to the credible threats facing us, to the enormous stakes involved and the ¶ dangers at hand, while also conveying a realistic “can do” message that ¶ underscores the opportunities for effectively dealing with this problem, the most ¶ serious threat to our security can be defeated

The alternative is to embrace American self-defense – fighting against Islamic totalitarianism is a justifiable policy that must be embraced

Lockitch 06, Keith Lockitch¶ The University of British Columbia, Fellow at the Ayn Rand Institute, 2006, “Why We Are Losing Hearts and Minds”, http://www.aynrand.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=13281&news\_iv\_ctrl=1063

Five years into our "war on terror," the Iraqi insurgency is raging, with no apparent end to the new recruits eager to wage jihad against the West. Support for offensive action has faded among a disheartened American public, while the terrorists are growing in number and in boldness.¶ Where have our leaders gone wrong? What kind of leadership failure can demoralize a whole nation of honest, productive citizens, while leaving suicide murderers stirred to righteous action?¶ The power that inspires righteous action--and which, by its absence, breeds discouragement--is the power of moral idealism. What has brought us to our present state is our leaders' moral weakness in response to the jihadists' moral zeal.¶ Observe that what draws the recruits to terrorist cells is a powerful ideal: the advancement of their religion. The jihadists believe fervently that Islam is the revealed word of Allah, that selfless submission to Allah is the purpose of life, and that all individuals should be subjugated to Islamic law under a theocracy. They believe in spreading the rule of Islam worldwide, and killing any "infidels" who stand in their way. They are morally outraged by the American ideal of individual liberty and regard our this-worldly, capitalistic culture as an evil that must be destroyed.¶ America can only defend itself against such a zealous, militant movement if we have moral confidence in our own ideals--and fight for them. We must repudiate the Islamists' "ideals" of other-worldliness, of blind faith, of renunciation and suffering, of theocracy, and proudly uphold the superior, American ideals of reason, freedom, and the pursuit of worldly happiness.¶ But our leaders have not shown such moral confidence.¶ When the terrorists of Sept. 11 struck in the name of Islam, President Bush did not identify them as Islamic totalitarians and condemn their murderous ideology and its supporters. Instead, he painted the hijackers as a band of isolated lunatics who had "hijacked a great religion." (Only recently has President Bush even acknowledged that our enemy is Islamic, with his use of the term "Islamic fascism.")¶ In response to Muslim denunciations of America’s secularism, our leaders did not defend this attribute of America, but instead stressed Americans' religiosity. A mere two weeks after Sept. 11, with the ruins of the World Trade Towers still smoldering, our planned Afghanistan campaign, "Operation Infinite Justice," was renamed to appease Muslims protesting that only Allah can dispense "infinite justice."¶ Unable to defend America intellectually, our leaders are unable to defend her militarily.¶ Have our leaders acted consistently against terrorist regimes? Consider our policy toward Iran, the primary state sponsor of terrorism. Refusing to identify Iran as the fatherland of Islamic totalitarianism, our president initially beseeched its Mullahs to join our "war on terror." And he has consistently answered their chants of "Death to America" and their quest for nuclear weapons with negotiation and spineless diplomacy.¶ Have our leaders asserted that they will use America’s formidable military to secure our way of life by whatever means necessary? No. Lacking the moral confidence to defeat our enemies, they have instead squandered our military resources and sacrificed our brave soldiers in a futile quest to spread "democracy" around the globe--as though bringing the vote to Muslim mobs sympathetic to Islamic totalitarianism will somehow end the terrorist threat.¶ The reason the terrorists and their state sponsors are not demoralized is that our leaders have failed to demoralize them. Our leaders' words and actions have signaled that we are not as morally committed to our lives and freedom as the terrorists are to our destruction.¶ We must make it clear to the jihadists that we will destroy anyone who takes up arms for Islamic totalitarianism. No one wants to fight and die for a hopeless cause. The jihadists will continue to be emboldened and to attract new recruits until they are convinced their goal is unachievable. They must see that we have the moral confidence to defend our lives--to answer their violence with an overwhelming military response, without pulling punches. They must see us willing to visit such crushing devastation on them that they fear us more than they fear Allah.¶ It is often said that we must win the "hearts and minds" of supporters of totalitarian Islam. Indeed we must: their hearts must be made to despair at the futility of their cause, and their minds must be convinced that any threat to our lives and freedom will bring them swift and certain doom.

## 3

Cuban engagement is limited --- even optimists vote neg

AP 6/21 (Associated Press, Cuba, US Try Talking, But Face Many Obstacles, p. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=194107378)

To be sure, there is still far more that separates the long-time antagonists than unites them. The State Department has kept Cuba on a list of state sponsors of terrorism and another that calls into question Havana's commitment to fighting human trafficking. The Obama administration continues to demand democratic change on an island ruled for more than a half century by Castro and his brother Fidel. For its part, Cuba continues to denounce Washington's 51-year-old economic embargo. And then there is Gross, the 64-year-old Maryland native who was arrested in 2009 and is serving a 15-year jail sentence for bringing communications equipment to the island illegally. His case has scuttled efforts at engagement in the past, and could do so again, U.S. officials say privately. Cuba has indicated it wants to trade Gross for four Cuban agents serving long jail terms in the United States, something Washington has said it won't consider. Ted Henken, a professor of Latin American studies at Baruch College in New York who helped organize a recent U.S. tour by Cuban dissident blogger Yoani Sanchez, said the Obama administration is too concerned with upsetting Cuban-American politicians and has missed opportunities to engage with Cuba at a crucial time in its history. "I think that a lot more would have to happen for this to amount to momentum leading to any kind of major diplomatic breakthrough," he said. "Obama should be bolder and more audacious

Any Cuba engagement is appeasement

Rubin 11 (Jennifer Rubin, Washington Post, “Obama’s Cuba appeasement”, Washington Post, 8/18, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/post/obamas-cuba-appeasement/2011/03/29/gIQAjuL2tL_blog.html>)

The chairwoman of the foreign affairs committee, Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen was equally irate: “According to news reports, the Administration attempted to barter for the freedom of wrongly imprisoned U.S. citizen Alan Gross by offering to return Rene Gonzalez, a convicted Cuban spy who was involved in the murder of innocent American citizens. If true, such a swap would demonstrate the outrageous willingness of the Administration to engage with the regime in Havana, which is designated by the U.S. as a state-sponsor of terrorism. Regrettably, this comes as no surprise as this Administration has never met a dictatorship with which it didn’t try to engage. It seems that a rogue regime cannot undertake a deed so dastardly that the Obama Administration would abandon engagement, even while talking tough with reporters. Cuba is a state-sponsor of terrorism. We should not be trying to barter with them. We must demand the unconditional release of Gross, not engage in a quid-pro-quo with tyrants.” As bad as a prisoner exchange would have been, the administration actions didn’t stop there. The Associated Press reported, “The Gross-Gonzalez swap was raised by former New Mexico Gov. Bill Richardson, as well as by senior U.S. officials in a series of meetings with Cuban officials. Richardson traveled to Cuba last month seeking Gross’ release. He also told Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez that the U.S. would be willing to consider other areas of interest to Cuba. Among them was removing Cuba from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism; reducing spending on Cuban democracy promotion programs like the one that led to the hiring of Gross; authorizing U.S. companies to help Cuba clean up oil spills from planned offshore drilling; improving postal exchanges; ending a program that makes it easier for Cuban medical personnel to move to the United States; and licensing the French company Pernod Ricard to sell Havana Club rum in the United States.” Former deputy national security adviser Elliott Abrams explained, “It is especially offensive that we were willing to negotiate over support for democracy in Cuba, for that would mean that the unjust imprisonment of Gross had given the Castro dictatorship a significant victory. The implications for those engaged in similar democracy promotion activities elsewhere are clear: local regimes would think that imprisoning an American might be a terrific way to get into a negotiation about ending such activities. Every American administration faces tough choices in these situations, but the Obama administration has made a great mistake here. Our support for democracy should not be a subject of negotiation with the Castro regime.” The administration’s conduct is all the more galling given the behavior of the Castro regime. Our willingness to relax sanctions was not greeted with goodwill gestures, let alone systemic reforms. To the contrary, this was the setting for Gross’s imprisonment. So naturally the administration orders up more of the same. Throughout his tenure, President Obama has failed to comprehend the cost-benefit analysis that despotic regimes undertake. He has offered armfuls of goodies and promised quietude on human rights; the despots’ behavior has worsened. There is simply no downside for rogue regimes to take their shots at the United States. Whether it is Cuba or [Iran,](http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/280214/iran-dangerous-and-diplomacy-has-failed-jamie-m-fly%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) the administration reverts to “engagement” mode when its engagement efforts are met with aggression and/or domestic oppression. Try to murder a diplomat on U.S. soil? We’ll sit down and chat. Grab an American contractor and try him in a kangaroo court? We’ll trade prisoners and talk about relaxing more sanctions. Invade Georgia, imprison political opponents and interfere with attempts to restart the peace process? We’ll put the screws on our democratic ally to get you into World Trade Organization. The response of these thuggish regimes is entirely predictable and, from their perspective, completely logical. What is inexplicable is the Obama administration’s willingness to throw gifts to tyrants in the expectation they will reciprocate in kind.

American consistency on threats and promises are key to U.S. credibility

**Etzioni 11** professor of international relations at George Washington University March-April Military Review “The Coming Test of U.S. Credibility” http://icps.gwu.edu/files/2011/03/credibility.pdf

THE RELATIVE POWER of the United States is declining—both because other nations are increasing their power and because the U. S. economic challenges and taxing overseas commitments are weakening it. In this context, the credibility of U.S. commitments and the perception that the United States will back up its threats and promises with appropriate action is growing in importance. In popular terms, high credibility allows a nation to get more mileage out of a relatively small amount of power, while low credibility leads to burning up much greater amounts of power. The Theory of Credibility One definition of power is the ability of A to make B follow a course of action that A prefers. The term “make” is highly relevant. When A convinces B of the merit of the course A prefers, and B voluntarily follows it, we can refer to this change of course as an application of “persuasive power” or “soft power.” However, most applications of power are based either on coercion (if you park in front of a fire hydrant, your car is towed) or economic incentives and disincentives (you are fined to the point where you would be disinclined to park there). In these applications of power, B maintains his original preferences but is either prevented from following them or is pained to a point where he will suspend resistance. Every time A calls on B to change course, A is tested twice. First, if B does not follow A’s call, A will fail to achieve its goals (Nazi Germany annexes Austria, despite protests by the United Kingdom and France). Second, A loses some credibility, making B less likely to heed A’s future demands (Nazi Germany becomes more likely to invade Poland). On the other hand, if B heeds A’s demand, A wins twice: it achieves its goal (e.g., the United States dismantles the regime of Saddam Hussein and establishes that there are no WMDs in Iraq), and it increases the likelihood that future demands will be heeded without power actually being exercised (e.g. Libya voluntarily dismantles its WMD program following the invasion of Iraq). In short, the higher a nation’s credibility, the more it will be able to achieve without actually employing its power or by employing less of it when it must exercise its power. Political scientists have qualified this basic version of the power/credibility theory. In his detailed examination of three historical cases, Daryl G. Press shows that in each instance, the Bs made decisions based upon their perception of the current intentions and capabilities of A, rather than on the extent to which A followed up on previous threats. Thus, if A does not have the needed forces or if A’s interests in the issue at hand are marginal, its threats will not carry much weight no matter how “credible” A was in the past. For example, if the United States had announced that it would invade Burma unless it released opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest (she was eventually released in November 2010), such a threat would not have carried much weight—regardless of past U.S. actions—because the issue did not seem reason enough for the United States to invade Burma, and because the U.S. Army was largely committed elsewhere. Another political scientist, Kathleen Cunningham, has shown that the credibility of promises—as opposed to the credibility of threats—is much more difficult to maintain because the implementation of promises is often stretched over long periods of time. 1 The bulk of this essay focuses on dealing with threats, rather than promises. Declining U.S. Power and Credibility Over the last few years, much attention has been paid to the relative decline of U.S. power, but much less has been said of changes in U.S. credibility. While there has been some erosion in the relative power of the United States measured since 1945 or 1990), the swings in the level of its credibility have been much more pronounced. When the United States withdrew its forces from Vietnam in 1973, its credibility suffered so much that many observers doubted whether the United States would ever deploy its military overseas unless it faced a much greater and direct threat than it faced in Southeast Asia. Additional setbacks over the next decades followed, including the failed rescue of American hostages in Iran during the last year of the Carter administration and President Reagan’s withdrawal of U.S. Marines from Lebanon after the October 1983 Hezbollah bombing of U.S. barracks in Beirut. The bombing killed 241 American servicemen, but it elicited no punitive response—the administration abandoned a plan to assault the training camp where Hezbollah had planned the attack. 2 Operation Desert Storm drastically increased U.S. military credibility. The United States and the UN demanded that Saddam Hussein withdraw from Kuwait. When he refused, U.S. and Allied forces quickly overwhelmed his military with a low level of American causalities, contrary to expectations. Saddam’s forces were defeated with less than 400 American casualties. 3 The total cost of defeating Saddam was $61 billion—almost 90 percent of which was borne by U.S. allies. 4 When Serbia ignored the demands of the United States and other Western nations to withdraw its hostile forces and halt ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, NATO forces defeated the Serbs with little effort, losing only two troops in a helicopter training accident. 5 U.S. credibility reached a high mark in 2003, when the United States, employing a much smaller force than in 1991, overthrew Saddam Hussein’s regime swiftly and with a low level of American casualties, again despite expectations to the contrary. In the first phase of the war—up to 1 May 2003, when the Saddam regime was removed and no WMDs were found—there had been only 172 American casualties. 6 Only $56 billion had been appropriated for Iraq operations. 7 Those who hold that credibility matters little should pay mind to the side effects of Operation Iraqi Freedom. After the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Libya did not merely stop developing WMDs or allow inspections, it allowed the United States to pack cargo In short, the higher a nation’s credibility, the more it will be able to achieve without actually employing its power …4 March-April 2011  MILITARY REVIEW planes with several tons of nuclear equipment and airlift it from the country. 8 The country surrendered centrifuges, mustard gas tanks, and SCUD missiles. It sent 13 kilograms of highly enriched uranium to Russia for blending down, destroyed chemical weapons, and has assisted the United States in cracking down on the global black market for nuclear arms technology. 9 The reasons are complex, and experts point out that Muammar al-Gaddafi, the leader of Libya, was under considerable domestic pressure to ease his country’s economic and political isolation. 10 Gaddafi also believed he was next in line for a forced regime change. In a private conversation with Silvio Berlusconi, Italy’s prime minister, in 2003, Gaddafi is reported to have said, “I will do whatever the Americans want, because I saw what happened in Iraq, and I was afraid.” 11 Iran’s best offer by far regarding its nuclear program occurred in 2003, at a time when U.S. credibility reached its apex. In a fax transmitted to the State Department through the Swiss ambassador, who confirmed that it had come from “key power centers” in Iran, Iran asked for “a broad dialogue with the United States.” The fax “suggested everything was on the table—including full cooperation on nuclear programs, acceptance of Israel and the termination of Iranian support for Palestinian militant groups.” 12 (The Bush administration, however, considered the Iranian regime to be on the verge of collapse at the time, and, according to reports, it “belittled the initiative.”) 13 Richard Haass, who at the time was serving as director of policy planning at the State Department, stated that the offer was spurned because “the bias [in the Bush administration] was toward a policy of regime change.” 14 Still, in 2004, Britain, France, and Germany secured a temporary suspension of uranium enrichment in Iran. 15 It lasted until 2006, when American credibility began to decline. 16 Also in 2004, Iran offered to make the “European Three” a guarantee that its nuclear program would be used “exclusively for peaceful purposes,” as long as the West would provide “firm commitments on security issues.” 17 In 2005, as U.S. difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan mounted and its level of casualties—as well as those of its allies and of the local populations—increased without a victory in sight, U.S. credibility was gradually undermined. Since 2005, more than 4,000 Americans and hundreds of thousands of Iraqis have died, and the direct cost of military operations in the country has exceeded $650 billion. 18 The same holds true in Afghanistan—only more strongly—already the longest war in which the United States has ever engaged, with rising casualties and costs. Both credibility-undermining developments were the result of a great expansion of the goals of the mission. In Iraq, the mission was initially to overthrow the regime and ensure that it has no WMDs. In Afghanistan, the mission was initially to eradicate Al-Qaeda. But in both countries, the mission morphed into the costly task of nation building—although other terms were used, such as reconstruction and COIN (counterinsurgency)— which includes building an effective and legitimate government composed of the native population. In popular terms, the United States won the wars but has been losing the peace. The distinction between the pure military phase (which was very successful in both countries) and the troubled nationbuilding phase that followed has eluded the Nation’s adversaries, who have focused on the fact that the United States seems to have great difficulties in making progress toward its expanded goals. Thus, even if the United States achieves its extended goals Saddam Hussein is seen in this image from video broadcast on Iraqi television, 2003. in these two nations, it will have done so only with great efforts and at high costs. And many observers are very doubtful that these nations will be turned into stable governments allied with the United States—let alone that they will be truly democratic. The fact that the United States is withdrawing from Iraq (and is on a timeline, however disputed, to begin withdrawal from Afghanistan)—regardless of whether its goals are fully accomplished—further feeds into the significant decline in its credibility. This stands out especially when compared to the credibility it enjoyed in 2003 and 2004. The fact that the United States has, on several occasions, made specific and very public demands of various countries, only to have these demands roundly ignored—without any consequences— has not added to its credibility. On several occasions, the United States demanded Israel extend the freeze on settlement construction in the West Bank and cease building in East Jerusalem. While one can question whether such a call for a total freeze was justified, especially as no concessions were demanded from the Palestinians, one cannot deny that, as Israel ignored these demands and faced no consequences, U.S. credibility was diminished. The same has occurred in Afghanistan. The United States voiced strong demands, only to be rebuffed very publicly by a government that would collapse were it not for American support. Moreover, the United States was forced to court President Hamid Karzai when he threatened to make peace on his own with the Taliban and was courted by Iran. A particularly telling example took place on 28 March 2010, when President Obama flew to Kabul and “delivered pointed criticism to Hamid Karzai” over pervasive corruption in the Afghan government. 19 Then-National Security Advisor James Jones voiced the president’s concerns, stating that Karzai “needs to be seized with how important” the issue of corruption is for American efforts in the country. 20 But Karzai was “angered and offended” by the visit.” 21 Only days later, he made a series of inflammatory remarks about Western interference in his country, accused foreigners of a “vast fraud” in the Afghan presidential election, and threatened to ally himself with the Taliban. 22 A few weeks after these statements, Karzai was in Washington as a guest of the White House, where he was wellreceived, and all seemed forgiven. The Next Test As I will show shortly, in recent years a large and growing number of U.S. allies and adversaries— especially in the Middle East—have questioned American commitment to back up its declared goals—that is, they question the Nation’s credibility. Hence, the way the United States conducts itself in the next test of its resolve will be unusually consequential for its position as a global power. I cannot emphasize enough that I am not arguing that the United States should seek a confrontation, let alone engage in a war, to show that it still has the capacity to back up its threats and promises by using conventional forces. (Few doubt U.S. power and ability to act as a nuclear power, but they also realize that nuclear power is ill-suited for many foreign policy goals.) However, I am suggesting that the ways in which the U.S. will respond to the next challenge to its power will have strong implications for its credibility—and for its need to employ power. One’s mind turns to two hot spots: North Korea and Iran. North Korea is an obvious testing ground for American resolve. While Iran is denying that it is developing a military nuclear program, North Korea flaunts its program. While Iran is using its proxies, Hezbollah and Hamas, to trouble U.S. allies in the Middle East, North Korea has openly attacked the U.S. ally South Korea, both by reportedly torpedoing a South Korean ship in March 2010, killing 46 sailors, and by shelling a South Korean island in November, killing two South Korean soldiers. While Iran is spewing over-the-top accusations against the West, its rhetoric is no match for North Korea’s bellicose statements and actions. In short, North Korea would seem to be the place where U.S. credibility is most being tested and will continue to be in the near future.

Nuclear war

Bosco 6 (David, a senior editor at Foreign Policy magazine) July “Forum: Keeping an eye peeled for World War III” http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/06211/709477-109.stm

The understanding that small but violent acts can spark global conflagration is etched into the world's consciousness. The reverberations from Princip's shots in the summer of 1914 ultimately took the lives of more than 10 million people, shattered four empires and dragged more than two dozen countries into war. This hot summer, as the world watches the violence in the Middle East, the awareness of peace's fragility is particularly acute. The bloodshed in Lebanon appears to be part of a broader upsurge in unrest. Iraq is suffering through one of its bloodiest months since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. Taliban militants are burning schools and attacking villages in southern Afghanistan as the United States and NATO struggle to defend that country's fragile government. Nuclear-armed India is still cleaning up the wreckage from a large terrorist attack in which it suspects militants from rival Pakistan. The world is awash in weapons, North Korea and Iran are developing nuclear capabilities, and long-range missile technology is spreading like a virus. Some see the start of a global conflict. "We're in the early stages of what I would describe as the Third World War," former House Speaker Newt Gingrich said recently. Certain religious Web sites are abuzz with talk of Armageddon. There may be as much hyperbole as prophecy in the forecasts for world war. But it's not hard to conjure ways that today's hot spots could ignite. Consider the following scenarios: Targeting Iran: As Israeli troops seek out and destroy Hezbollah forces in southern Lebanon, intelligence officials spot a shipment of longer-range Iranian missiles heading for Lebanon. The Israeli government decides to strike the convoy and Iranian nuclear facilities simultaneously. After Iran has recovered from the shock, Revolutionary Guards surging across the border into Iraq, bent on striking Israel's American allies. Governments in Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia face violent street protests demanding retribution against Israel -- and they eventually yield, triggering a major regional war. Missiles away: With the world's eyes on the Middle East, North Korea's Kim Jong Il decides to continue the fireworks show he began earlier this month. But this time his brinksmanship pushes events over the brink. A missile designed to fall into the sea near Japan goes astray and hits Tokyo, killing a dozen civilians. Incensed, the United States, Japan's treaty ally, bombs North Korean missile and nuclear sites. North Korean artillery batteries fire on Seoul, and South Korean and U.S. troops respond. Meanwhile, Chinese troops cross the border from the north to stem the flow of desperate refugees just as U.S. troops advance from the south. Suddenly, the world's superpower and the newest great power are nose to nose. Loose nukes: Al-Qaida has had Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf in its sights for years, and the organization finally gets its man. Pakistan descends into chaos as militants roam the streets and the army struggles to restore order. India decides to exploit the vacuum and punish the Kashmir-based militants it blames for the recent Mumbai railway bombings. Meanwhile, U.S. special operations forces sent to secure Pakistani nuclear facilities face off against an angry mob. The empire strikes back: Pressure for democratic reform erupts in autocratic Belarus. As protesters mass outside the parliament in Minsk, president Alexander Lukashenko requests Russian support. After protesters are beaten and killed, they appeal for help, and neighboring Poland -- a NATO member with bitter memories of Soviet repression -- launches a humanitarian mission to shelter the regime's opponents. Polish and Russian troops clash, and a confrontation with NATO looms. As in the run-up to other wars, there is today more than enough tinder lying around to spark a great power conflict. The question is how effective the major powers have become at managing regional conflicts and preventing them from escalating. After two world wars and the decades-long Cold War, what has the world learned about managing conflict? The end of the Cold War had the salutary effect of dialing down many regional conflicts. In the 1960s and 1970s, every crisis in the Middle East had the potential to draw in the superpowers in defense of their respective client states. The rest of the world was also part of the Cold War chessboard. Compare the almost invisible U.N. peacekeeping mission in Congo today to the deeply controversial mission there in the early 1960s. (The Soviets were convinced that the U.N. mission was supporting a U.S. puppet, and Russian diplomats stormed out of several Security Council meetings in protest.) From Angola to Afghanistan, nearly every Cold War conflict was a proxy war. Now, many local crises can be handed off to the humanitarians or simply ignored. But the end of the bipolar world has a downside. In the old days, the two competing superpowers sometimes reined in bellicose client states out of fear that regional conflicts would escalate. Which of the major powers today can claim to have such influence over Tehran or Pyongyang? Today's world has one great advantage: None of the leading powers appears determined to reorder international affairs as Germany was before both world wars and as Japan was in the years before World War II. True, China is a rapidly rising power -- an often destabilizing phenomenon in international relations -- but it appears inclined to focus on economic growth rather than military conquest (with the possible exception of Taiwan). Russia is resentful about its fall from superpower status, but it also seems reconciled to U.S. military dominance and more interested in tapping its massive oil and gas reserves than in rebuilding its decrepit military. Indeed, U.S. military superiority seems to be a key to global stability. Some theories of international relations predict that other major powers will eventually band together to challenge American might, but it's hard to find much evidence of such behavior. The United States, after all, invaded Iraq without U.N. approval and yet there was not even a hint that France, Russia or China would respond militarily. There is another factor working in favor of great-power caution: nuclear weapons. Europe's leaders on the eve of World War I can perhaps be forgiven for not understanding the carnage they were about to unleash. That generation grew up in a world of short wars that did limited damage. Leaders today should have no such illusions. The installation of emergency hot lines between national capitals was a recognition of the need for fast and clear communication in times of crisis. Diplomatic tools have advanced too. Sluggish though it may be, the U.N. Security Council regularly gathers the great powers' representatives in a room to hash out developing crises. So there is reason to hope that the major powers have little interest in playing with fire and the tools to stamp it out. But complacency is dangerous. The British economist Norman Angell once argued persuasively that deep economic links made conflict between the great powers obsolete. His book appeared in 1910 and was still in shops when Europe's armies poured across their borders in 1914.

## 4

Text: We advocate the entire 1AC without the use of the plan text.

Net benefit – Roleplaying as the USFG only trains us to become servants to the bureaucracy and makes us cognitively defenseless against the logic of institutions

Schlag 91 (PIERRE, COLORADO LAW PROF. 139 U. PA. L. REV.801, APRIL)

The problem for us, as legal thinkers, is that the normative appeal of normative legal thought systematically turns us away from recognizing that normative legal thought is grounded on an utterly unbelievable re-presentation of the field it claims to describe and regulate. The problem for us is that normative legal thought, rather than assisting in the understanding of present political and moral situations, stands in the way. It systematically reinscribes its own aesthetic -- its own fantastic understanding of the political and moral scene. n59 Until normative legal thought begins to deal with its own paradoxical postmodern rhetorical situation, it will remain something of an irresponsible enterprise. In its rhetorical structure, it will continue to populate the legal academic world with individual humanist subjects who think themselves empowered Cartesian egos, but who are largely the manipulated constructions of bureaucratic practices -- academic and otherwise. n60 To the extent possible, it is important to avoid this kind of category mistake. For instance, it is important to understand that your automobile insurance adjuster is not simply some updated version of the eighteenth century [\*189] individual humanist subject. Even though the insurance adjuster will quite often engage you in normative talk -- arguing with you about responsibility, fairness, fault, allocation of blame, adequacy of compensation, and the like -- he is unlikely to be terribly receptive or susceptible to any authentic normative dialogue. His normative competence, his normative sensitivity, is scripted somewhere else. It is important to be clear about these things. The contemporary lawyer, for instance, may talk the normative rhetoric of the eighteenth century individual humanist subject. But make no mistake: This normative or humanist rhetoric is very likely the unfolding of bureaucratic logic. The modern lawyer is very often a kind of meta-insurance adjuster. And that makes you and me, as legal academics, trainers of meta-insurance adjusters. This is perhaps an unpleasant realization. One of the most important effects of normative legal thought is to intercede here so that we, as legal academics, do not have to confront this unpleasant realization. Normative legal thought allows us to pretend that we are preparing our students to become Atticus Finch n61 while we are in fact training people who will enter the meta-insurance adjustment business. For our students, this role-confusion is unlikely to be very funny. It will get even less so upon their graduation -- when they learn that Atticus Finch has been written out of the script. For us, of course, it is a pleasant fantasy to think we are teaching Atticus Finch. When the fantasy is over, it becomes one hell of a category mistake. And in the rude transition from the one to the other, Atticus Finch can quickly turn into Dan Quayle. In fact, if you train your students to become Atticus Finch, they will likely end up as Dan Quayle -- cognitively defenseless against the regimenting and monitoring practices of bureaucratic institutions. Atticus Finch, as admirable as he may be, has none of the cognitive or critical resources necessary to understand the duplicities of the bureaucratic networks within which we operate. Apart from the fantasies of the legal academy, there is no longer a place in America for a lawyer like Atticus Finch. There is nothing for him to do here -- nothing he can do. He is a moral character in a world where the role of moral thought has become at best highly ambivalent, a normative thinker in a world where normative legal thought is already largely the bureaucratic logic of institutions.

No Solvency - Their solvency presupposes the rationality of both agencies which are by definition irrational and individuals who are unwittingly just cogs in the bureaucratic machine

Schlag 91 (PIERRE, COLORADO LAW PROF. 139 U. PA. L. REV.801, APRIL)

For these legal thinkers, it will seem especially urgent to ask once again: What should be done? How should we live? What should the law be? These are the hard questions. These are the momentous questions. [\*805] And they are the wrong ones. They are wrong because it is these very normative questions that reprieve legal thinkers from recognizing the extent to which the cherished "ideals" of legal academic thought are implicated in the reproduction and maintenance of precisely those ugly "realities" of legal practice the academy so routinely condemns. It is these normative questions that allow legal thinkers to shield themselves from the recognition that their work product consists largely of the reproduction of rhetorical structures by which human beings can be coerced into achieving ends of dubious social origin and implication. It is these very normative questions that allow legal academics to continue to address (rather lamely) bureaucratic power structures as if they were rational, morally competent, individual humanist subjects. It is these very normative questions that allow legal thinkers to assume blithely that -- in a world ruled by HMOs, personnel policies, standard operating procedures, performance requirements, standard work incentives, and productivity monitoring -- they somehow have escaped the bureaucratic power games. It is these normative questions that enable them to represent themselves as whole and intact, as self-directing individual liberal humanist subjects at once rational, morally competent, and in control of their own situations, the captain of their own ships, the Hercules of their own empires, the author of their own texts. It isn't so.  **n5** And if it isn't so, it would seem advisable to make some adjustments in the agenda and practice of legal thought. That is what I will be trying to do here. Much of what follows will no doubt seem threatening or nihilistic to many readers. In part that is because this article puts in question the very coherence, meaningfulness, and integrity of the kinds of normative disputes and discussion that almost all of us in the legal academy practice.

## 5

Fast Track fight is on the top of the agenda-Strong push from Obama is key-Failure collapses global trade momentum

Good-Farm Policy-12/31/13

The FarmPolicy.com News Summary

HEADLINE: Farm Bill; Ag Economy; and, Biofuels- Tuesday

And with respect to trade, the Chicago Tribune editorial board[18] noted yesterday that, 'President Barack Obama wants the power to negotiate free-trade treaties on a fast track. With Trade Promotion Authority, he would have a good chance of clinching huge trade pacts now being hammered out with Europe and Asia. Yet Congress may not give him that authority — for all the wrong reasons.' The Tribune opinion item stated that, 'Within months the White House hopes to finish talks on a proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership with a group of Asia-Pacific nations. Talks with the European Union on the planned Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership are progressing too. Those deals would eliminate barriers and promote economic activity between the U.S. and key allies. The upside is huge: Billions of dollars in new business would be generated if these pacts come to pass. 'Yet given the special interests that oppose free trade, neither deal stands much of a chance in Congress without TPA. Consider farm tariffs, one of the most frustrating roadblocks to any free-trade pact with Europe or Asia. The agriculture lobby here and abroad has long succeeded in imposing some of the least competitive public policies of any industry. Although farm protectionism hurts the vast majority of the world's citizens, standing up to clout-heavy constituencies such as U.S. sugar magnates requires extraordinary political courage. TPA is essential for overcoming the inevitable fight against vested interests that are determined to advance themselves at the expense of the nation's good. 'Federal lawmakers and the president have to make their case with much more gusto than we have seen so far. Congress could OK a Trade Promotion Authority bill in the first few months of 2014. But that won't happen without leadership on Capitol Hill and, especially, from the White House. Now's the time.'

Plan costs capital and is a flip-flop

Williams 13 (Carol, currently at the LA Times, A foreign correspondent for 25 years, Carol J. Williams traveled to and reported from more than 80 countries in Europe, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America, Political calculus keeps Cuba on U.S. list of terror sponsors. [http://www.latimes.com/news/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-cuba-us-terror-list-20130502,0,2494970.story#ixzz2YmmqmyTI](http://www.latimes.com/news/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-cuba-us-terror-list-20130502%2C0%2C2494970.story#ixzz2YmmqmyTI), 5/3/13)

The decision to retain Cuba on the list surprised some observers of the long-contentious relationship between Havana and Washington. Since Fidel Castro retired five years ago and handed the reins of power to his younger brother, Raul, modest economic reforms have been tackled and the government has revoked the practice of requiring Cubans to get “exit visas” before they could leave their country for foreign travel. There was talk early in Obama’s first term of easing the 51-year-old embargo, and Kerry, though still in the Senate then, wrote a commentary for the Tampa Bay Tribune in 2009 in which he deemed the security threat from Cuba “a faint shadow.” He called then for freer travel between the two countries and an end to the U.S. policy of isolating Cuba “that has manifestly failed for nearly 50 years.” The political clout of the Cuban American community in South Florida and more recently Havana’s refusal to release Gross have kept any warming between the Cold War adversaries at bay. It’s a matter of political priorities and trade-offs, Aramesh said. He noted that former Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton last year exercised her discretion to get the Iranian opposition group Mujahedeen Khalq, or MEK, removed from the government’s list of designated terrorist organizations. That move was motivated by the hopes of some in Congress that the group could be aided and encouraged to eventually challenge the Tehran regime. “It’s a question of how much political cost you want to incur or how much political capital you want to spend,” Aramesh said. “President Obama has decided not to reach out to Cuba, that he has more important foreign policy battles elsewhere.”

Free trade prevents multiple scenarios for world war and WMD Terrorism

Panzner 2008

Michael, faculty at the New York Institute of Finance, 25-year veteran of the global stock, bond, and currency markets who has worked in New York and London for HSBC, Soros Funds, ABN Amro, Dresdner Bank, and JPMorgan Chase “Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse,” pg. 136-138

Continuing calls for curbs on the flow of finance and trade will inspire the United States and other nations to spew forth protectionist legislation like the notorious Smoot-Hawley bill. Introduced at the start of the Great Depression, it triggered a series of tit-for-tat economic responses, which many commentators believe helped turn a serious economic downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster. But if history is any guide, those lessons will have been long forgotten during the next collapse. Eventually, fed by a mood of desperation and growing public anger, restrictions on trade, finance, investment, and immigration will almost certainly intensify. Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely scrutinize the cross-border movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers may even call for a general crackdown on nonessential travel. Meanwhile, many nations will make transporting or sending funds to other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate officials try to limit the fallout from decades of ill-conceived, corrupt, and reckless policies, they will introduce controls on foreign exchange. Foreign individuals and companies seeking to acquire certain American infrastructure assets, or trying to buy property and other assets on the cheap thanks to a rapidly depreciating dollar, will be stymied by limits on investment by noncitizens. Those efforts will cause spasms to ripple across economies and markets, disrupting global payment, settlement, and clearing mechanisms. All of this will, of course, continue to undermine business confidence and consumer spending. In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that transmits systemic financial pressures across markets through arbitrage or portfolio-based risk management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by tourists and wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates unwelcome exchanges of any kind will be viewed with suspicion and dealt with accordingly. The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation” between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.

## Case

### Terror

Nobody cares about their hippie therapy platform

Ferguson 2009 (Niall, American Interest, http://www.the-american-interest.com/ai2/article.cfm?Id=335&MId=16)

So much for the American predicament. What of Posen’s alternative grand strategy based on American self-restraint? The terms he uses are themselves revealing. The United States needs to be more “reticent” about its use of military force, more “modest” about its political goals overseas, more “distant” from traditional allies, and more “stingy” in its aid policies. Good luck to the presidential candidate who laces his next foreign policy speech with those adjectives: “My fellow Americans, I want to make this great country of ours more reticent, modest, distant and stingy!” Let us, however, leave aside this quintessentially academic and operationally useless rhetoric. What exactly does Posen want the United States to do? I count six concrete recommendations. The United States should: 1) Abandon the Bush Doctrine of “preemption”, which in the case of Iraq has been a policy of preventive war. Posen argues that this applies even in cases of nuclear proliferation. By implication, he sees preventive war as an inferior option to deterrence, though he does not make clear how exactly a nuclear-armed Iran would be deterred, least of all if his second recommendation were to be implemented. 2) Reduce U.S. military presence in the Middle East (“the abode of Islam”) by abandoning “its permanent and semi-permanent land bases in Arab countries.” Posen does not say so, but he appears to imply the abandonment of all these bases, not just the ones in Iraq, but also those in, for example, Qatar. It is not clear what would be left of Central Command after such a drastic retreat. Note that this would represent a break with the policy not just of the last two Presidents, but with that of the last 12. 3) Ramp up efforts to provide relief in the wake of natural disasters, exemplified by Operation Unified Assistance after the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 26, 2004. No doubt the American military did some good in the wake of the tsunami, but Posen needs to explain why a government that so miserably bungled the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina less than a year later should be expected to be consistently effective in the wake of natural disasters. 4) Assist in humanitarian military interventions only “under reasonable guidelines” and “in coalitions, operating under some kind of regional or international political mandate.” Does Posen mean that he would favor sending American troops to Darfur at the same time as he is withdrawing them from other “abodes of Islam?” He does not say. 5) Promote not democracy abroad but “the rule of law, press freedom and the rights of collective bargaining.” Here again I am experiencing cognitive dissonance. The government that sought systematically to evade the Geneva Conventions in order to detain indefinitely and torture suspected terrorists as an upholder of the rule of law? 6) Stop offering “U.S. security guarantees and security assistance, [which] tend to relieve others of the need to do more to ensure their own security.” This is in fact the most important of all Posen’s recommendations, though he saves it until last. He envisages radical diminution of American support for other members of NATO. Over the next ten years, he writes, the United States “should gradually withdraw from all military headquarters and commands in Europe.” In the same timeframe it should “reduce U.S. government direct financial assistance to Israel to zero”, as well as reducing (though not wholly eliminating) assistance to Egypt. And it should “reconsider its security relationship with Japan”, whatever that means. Again, this represents a break with traditional policy so radical that it would impress even Noam Chomsky, to say nothing of Osama bin Laden (who would, indeed, find little here to object to). Posen, in other words, has proceeded from relatively familiar premises (the limits of American “hyperpower”) to some quite fantastic policy recommendations, which are perhaps best summed up as a cross between isolationism and humanitarianism. Only slightly less fantastic than his vision of an American military retreat from the Middle East, Europe and East Asia is Posen’s notion that it could be sold to the American electorate—just six years after they were the targets of the single largest terrorist attack in history—in the language of self-effacement. Coming from a man who wants to restart mainstream debate on American grand strategy, that is pretty rich.

Jackson and critical terror studies are wrong – no evidence to substantiate their claims and no viable alternative

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The journal, in other words, is not intended, as one might assume, to evaluate critically those state or non-state actors that might have recourse to terrorism as a strategy. Instead, the journal's ambition is to deconstruct what it views as the ambiguity of the word “terror,” its manipulation by ostensibly liberal democratic state actors, and the complicity of “orthodox” terrorism studies in this authoritarian enterprise. Exposing the deficiencies in any field of study is, of course, a legitimate scholarly exercise, but what the symposium introducing the new volume announces questions both the research agenda and academic integrity of journals like *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* and those who contribute to them. Do these claims, one might wonder, have any substance?

Significantly, the original proposal circulated by the publisher Routledge and one of the editors, Richard Jackson, suggested some uncertainty concerning the preferred title of the journal. *Critical Studies on Terrorism* appeared last on a list where the first choice was *Review of Terror Studies*. Evidently, the concision of a review fails to capture the critical perspective the journal promotes. Criticism, then, is central to the new journal's philosophy and the adjective connotes a distinct ideological and, as shall be seen, far from pluralist and inclusive purpose. So, one might ask, what exactly does a critical approach to terrorism involve?

What it Means to be Critical

The editors and contributors explore what it means to be “critical” in detail, repetition, and opacity, along with an excessive fondness for italics, in the editorial symposium that introduces the first issue, and in a number of subsequent articles. The editors inform us that the study of terrorism is “a growth industry,” observing with a mixture of envy and disapproval that “literally thousands of new books and articles on terrorism are published every year” (pp. l-2). In adding to this literature the editors premise the need for yet another journal on their resistance to what currently constitutes scholarship in the field of terrorism study and its allegedly uncritical acceptance of the Western democratic state's security perspective.

Indeed, to be critical requires a radical reversal of what the journal assumes to be the typical perception of terrorism and the methodology of terrorism research. To focus on the strategies practiced by non-state actors that feature under the conventional denotation “terror” is, for the critical theorist, misplaced. As the symposium explains, “acts of clandestine non-state terrorism are committed by a tiny number of individuals and result in between a few hundred and a few thousand casualties *per year over the entire world*” (original italics) (p. 1). The United States's and its allies' preoccupation with terrorism is, therefore, out of proportion to its effects.1 At the same time, the more pervasive and repressive terror practiced by the state has been “silenced from public and … academic discourse” (p. 1).

The complicity of terrorism studies with the increasingly authoritarian demands of Western, liberal state and media practice, together with the moral and political blindness of established terrorism analysts to this relationship forms the journal's overriding assumption and one that its core contributors repeat ad nauseam. Thus, Michael Stohl, in his contribution “Old Myths, New Fantasies and the Enduring Realities of Terrorism” (pp. 5-16), not only discovers ten “myths” informing the understanding of terrorism, but also finds that these myths reflect a “state centric security focus,” where analysts rarely consider “the violence perpetrated by the state” (p. 5). He complains that the press have become too close to government over the matter. Somewhat contradictorily Stohl subsequently asserts that media reporting is “central to terrorism and counter-terrorism as political action,” that media reportage provides the oxygen of terrorism, and that politicians consider journalists to be “the terrorist's best friend” (p. 7).

Stohl further compounds this incoherence, claiming that “the media are far more likely to focus on the destructive actions, rather than on … grievances or the social conditions that breed [terrorism]—to present episodic rather than thematic stories” (p. 7). He argues that terror attacks between 1968 and 1980 were scarcely reported in the United States, and that reporters do not delve deeply into the sources of conflict (p. 8). All of this is quite contentious, with no direct evidence produced to support such statements. The “media” is after all a very broad term, and to assume that it is monolithic is to replace criticism with conspiracy theory. Moreover, even if it were true that the media always serves as a government propaganda agency, then by Stohl's own logic, terrorism as a method of political communication is clearly futile as no rational actor would engage in a campaign doomed to be endlessly misreported.

Nevertheless, the notion that an inherent pro-state bias vitiates terrorism studies pervades the critical position. Anthony Burke, in “The End of Terrorism Studies” (pp. 37-49), asserts that established analysts like Bruce Hoffman “specifically exclude states as possible perpetrators” of terror. Consequently, the emergence of “critical terrorism studies” “may signal the end of a particular kind of traditionally state-focused and directed 'problem-solving' terrorism studies—at least in terms of its ability to assume that its categories and commitments are immune from challenge and correspond to a stable picture of reality” (p. 42).

Elsewhere, Adrian Guelke, in “Great Whites, Paedophiles and Terrorists: The Need for Critical Thinking in a New Era of Terror” (pp. 17-25), considers British government-induced media “scare-mongering” to have legitimated an “authoritarian approach” to the purported new era of terror (pp. 22-23). Meanwhile, Joseba Zulaika and William A. Douglass, in “The Terrorist Subject: Terrorist Studies and the Absent Subjectivity” (pp. 27-36), find the War on Terror constitutes “*the* single,” all embracing paradigm of analysis where the critical voice is “not allowed to ask: what is the reality itself?” (original italics) (pp. 28-29). The construction of this condition, they further reveal, if somewhat abstrusely, reflects an abstract “desire” that demands terror as “an ever-present threat” (p. 31). In order to sustain this fabrication: “Terrorism experts and commentators” function as “realist policemen”; and not very smart ones at that, who while “gazing at the evidence” are “unable to read the paradoxical logic of the desire that fuels it, whereby *lack* turns to*excess*” (original italics) (p. 32). Finally, Ken Booth, in “The Human Faces of Terror: Reflections in a Cracked Looking Glass” (pp. 65-79), reiterates Richard Jackson's contention that state terrorism “is a much more serious problem than non-state terrorism” (p. 76).

Yet, one searches in vain in these articles for evidence to support the ubiquitous assertion of state bias: assuming this bias in conventional terrorism analysis as a fact seemingly does not require a corresponding concern with evidence of this fact, merely its continual reiteration by conceptual fiat. A critical perspective dispenses not only with terrorism studies but also with the norms of accepted scholarship. Asserting what needs to be demonstrated commits, of course, the elementary logical fallacy *petitio principii*. But critical theory apparently emancipates (to use its favorite verb) its practitioners from the confines of logic, reason, and the usual standards of academic inquiry.

Alleging a constitutive weakness in established scholarship without the necessity of providing proof to support it, therefore, appears to define the critical posture. The unproved “state centricity” of terrorism studies serves as a platform for further unsubstantiated accusations about the state of the discipline. Jackson and his fellow editors, along with later claims by Zulaika and Douglass, and Booth, again assert that “orthodox” analysts rarely bother “to interview or engage with those involved in 'terrorist' activity” (p. 2) or spend any time “on the ground in the areas most affected by conflict” (p. 74). Given that Booth and Jackson spend most of their time on the ground in Aberystwyth, Ceredigion, not a notably terror rich environment if we discount the operations of *Meibion Glyndwr* who would as a matter of principle avoid *pob sais* like Jackson and Booth, this seems a bit like the pot calling the kettle black. It also overlooks the fact that *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* first advertised the problem of “talking to terrorists” in 2001 and has gone to great lengths to rectify this lacuna, if it is one, regularly publishing articles by analysts with first-hand experience of groups like the Taliban, Al Qaeda and *Jemaah Islamiyah*.

A consequence of avoiding primary research, it is further alleged, leads conventional analysts uncritically to apply psychological and problem-solving approaches to their object of study. This propensity, Booth maintains, occasions another unrecognized weakness in traditional terrorism research, namely, an inability to engage with “the particular dynamics of the political world” (p. 70). Analogously, Stohl claims that “the US and English [sic] media” exhibit a tendency to psychologize terrorist acts, which reduces “structural and political problems” into issues of individual pathology (p. 7). Preoccupied with this problem-solving, psychopathologizing methodology, terrorism analysts have lost the capacity to reflect on both their practice and their research ethics.

By contrast, the critical approach is not only self-reflective, but also and, for good measure, self-reflexive. In fact, the editors and a number of the journal's contributors use these terms interchangeably, treating a reflection and a reflex as synonyms (p. 2). A cursory encounter with the *Shorter Oxford Dictionary* would reveal that they are not. Despite this linguistically challenged misidentification, “reflexivity” is made to do a lot of work in the critical idiom. Reflexivity, the editors inform us, requires a capacity “to challenge dominant knowledge and understandings, is sensitive to the politics of labelling … is transparent about its own values and political standpoints, adheres to a set of responsible research ethics, and is committed to a broadly defined notion of emancipation” (p. 2). This covers a range of not very obviously related but critically approved virtues. Let us examine what reflexivity involves as Stohl, Guelke, Zulaika and Douglass, Burke, and Booth explore, somewhat repetitively, its implications.

Reflexive or Defective?

Firstly, to challenge dominant knowledge and understanding and retain sensitivity to labels leads inevitably to a fixation with language, discourse, the ambiguity of the noun, terror, and its political use and abuse. Terrorism, Booth enlightens the reader unremarkably, is “a politically loaded term” (p. 72). Meanwhile, Zulaika and Douglass consider terror “the dominant tropic [sic] space in contemporary political and journalistic discourse” (p. 30). Faced with the “serious challenge” (Booth p. 72) and pejorative connotation that the noun conveys, critical terrorologists turn to deconstruction and bring the full force of postmodern obscurantism to bear on its use. Thus the editors proclaim that terrorism is “one of the most powerful signifiers in contemporary discourse.” There is, moreover, a “yawning gap between the 'terrorism' signifier and the actual acts signified” (p. 1). “[V]irtually all of this activity,” the editors pronounce *ex cathedra*, “refers to the *response* to acts of political violence not the violence itself” (original italics) (p. 1). Here again they offer no evidence for this curious assertion and assume, it would seem, all conventional terrorism studies address issues of homeland security.

In keeping with this critical orthodoxy that he has done much to define, Anthony Burke also asserts the “instability (and thoroughly politicized nature) of the unifying master-terms of our field: 'terror' and 'terrorism'” (p. 38). To address this he contends that a critical stance requires us to “keep this radical instability and inherent politicization of the concept of terrorism at the forefront of its analysis.” Indeed, “without a conscious reflexivity about the most basic definition of the object, our discourse will not be critical at all” (p. 38). More particularly, drawing on a jargon-infused amalgam of Michel Foucault's identification of a relationship between power and knowledge, the neo-Marxist Frankfurt School's critique of democratic false consciousness, mixed with the existentialism of the Third Reich's favorite philosopher, Martin Heidegger, Burke “*questions the question*.” This intellectual *potpourri* apparently enables the critical theorist to “question the ontological status of a 'problem' before any attempt to map out, study or resolve it” (p. 38).

Interestingly, Burke, Booth, and the symposistahood deny that there might be objective data about violence or that a properly focused strategic study of terrorism would not include any prescriptive goodness or rightness of action. While a strategic theorist or a skeptical social scientist might claim to consider only the complex relational situation that involves as well as the actions, the attitude of human beings to them, the critical theorist's radical questioning of language denies this possibility.

The critical approach to language and its deconstruction of an otherwise useful, if imperfect, political vocabulary has been the source of much confusion and inconsequentiality in the practice of the social sciences. It dates from the relativist pall that French radical post structural philosophers like Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Foucault, and Jacques Derrida, cast over the social and historical sciences in order to demonstrate that social and political knowledge depended on and underpinned power relations that permeated the landscape of the social and reinforced the liberal democratic state. This radical assault on the possibility of either neutral fact or value ultimately functions unfalsifiably, and as a substitute for philosophy, social science, and a real theory of language.

The problem with the critical approach is that, as the Australian philosopher John Anderson demonstrated, to achieve a genuine study one must either investigate the facts that are talked about or the fact that they are talked about in a certain way. More precisely, as J.L. Mackie explains, “if we concentrate on the uses of language we fall between these two stools, and we are in danger of taking our discoveries about manners of speaking as answers to questions about what is there.”2 Indeed, in so far as an account of the use of language spills over into ontology it is liable to be a confused mixture of what should be two distinct investigations: the study of the facts about which the language is used, and the study of the linguistic phenomena themselves.

It is precisely, however, this confused mixture of fact and discourse that critical thinking seeks to impose on the study of terrorism and infuses the practice of critical theory more generally. From this confused seed no coherent method grows.

What is To Be Done?

This ontological confusion notwithstanding, Ken Booth sees critical theory not only exposing the dubious links between power and knowledge in established terrorism studies, but also offering an ideological agenda that transforms the face of global politics. “[*C*]*ritical knowledge*,” Booth declares, “*involves understandings of the social world that attempt to stand outside prevailing structures, processes, ideologies and orthodoxies while recognizing that all conceptualizations within the ambit of sociality derive from particular social/historical conditions*” (original italics) (p. 78). Helpfully, Booth, assuming the manner of an Old Testament prophet, provides his critical disciples with “*big-picture* navigation aids” (original italics) (p. 66) to achieve this higher knowledge. Booth promulgates fifteen commandments (as Clemenceau remarked of Woodrow Wilson's nineteen points, in a somewhat different context, “God Almighty only gave us ten”). When not stating the staggeringly obvious, the Ken Commandments are hopelessly contradictory. Critical theorists thus should “avoid exceptionalizing the study of terrorism,”3 “recognize that states can be agents of terrorism,” and “keep the long term in sight.” Unexceptional advice to be sure and long recognized by more traditional students of terrorism. The critical student, if not fully conversant with critical doublethink, however, might find the fact that she or he lives within “Powerful theories” that are “constitutive of political, social, and economic life” (6th Commandment, p. 71), sits uneasily with Booth's concluding injunction to “stand outside” prevailing ideologies (p. 78).

In his preferred imperative idiom, Booth further contends that terrorism is best studied in the context of an “academic international relations” whose role “is not only to interpret the world but to change it” (pp. 67-68). Significantly, academic—or more precisely, critical—international relations, holds no place for a realist appreciation of the status quo but approves instead a Marxist ideology of praxis. It is within this transformative praxis that critical theory situates terrorism and terrorists.

The political goals of those non-state entities that choose to practice the tactics of terrorism invariably seek a similar transformative praxis and this leads “critical global theorizing” into a curiously confused empathy with the motives of those engaged in such acts, as well as a disturbing relativism. Thus, Booth again decrees that the gap between “those who hate terrorism and those who carry it out, those who seek to delegitimize the acts of terrorists and those who incite them, and those who abjure terror and those who glorify it—is not as great as is implied or asserted by orthodox terrorism experts, the discourse of governments, or the popular press” (p. 66). The gap “between us/them is a slippery slope, not an unbridgeable political and ethical chasm” (p. 66). So, while “terrorist actions are always—without exception—wrong, they nevertheless might be contingently excusable” (p. 66). From this ultimately relativist perspective gang raping a defenseless woman, an act of terror on any critical or uncritical scale of evaluation, is, it would seem, wrong but potentially excusable.

On the basis of this worrying relativism a further Ken Commandment requires the abolition of the discourse of evil on the somewhat questionable grounds that evil releases agents from responsibility (pp. 74-75). This not only reveals a profound ignorance of theology, it also underestimates what Eric Voeglin identified as a central feature of the appeal of modern political religions from the Third Reich to Al Qaeda. As Voeglin observed in 1938, the Nazis represented an “attractive force.” To understand that force requires not the abolition of evil [so necessary to the relativist] but comprehending its attractiveness. Significantly, as Barry Cooper argues, “its attractiveness, [like that of al Qaeda] cannot fully be understood apart from its evilness.”4

The line of relativist inquiry that critical theorists like Booth evince toward terrorism leads in fact not to moral clarity but an inspissated moral confusion. This is paradoxical given that the editors make much in the journal's introductory symposium of their “responsible research ethics.” The paradox is resolved when one realizes that critical moralizing demands the “ethics of responsibility to the terrorist other.” For Ken Booth it involves, it appears, empathizing “with the ethic of responsibility” faced by those who, “in extremis” “have some explosives” (p. 76). Anthony Burke contends that a critically self-conscious normativism requires the analyst, not only to “critique” the “strategic languages” of the West, but also to “take in” the “side of the Other” or more particularly “engage” “with the highly developed forms of thinking” that provides groups like Al Qaeda “with legitimizing foundations and a world view of some profundity” (p. 44). This additionally demands a capacity not only to empathize with the “other,” but also to recognize that both Osama bin Laden in his *Messages to the West* and Sayyid Qutb in his Muslim Brotherhood manifesto *Milestones* not only offer “well observed” criticisms of Western decadence, but also “converges with elements of critical theory” (p. 45). This is not surprising given that both Islamist and critical theorists share an analogous contempt for Western democracy, the market, and the international order these structures inhabit and have done much to shape.

Histrionically Speaking

Critical theory, then, embraces relativism not only toward language but also toward social action. Relativism and the bizarre ethicism it engenders in its attempt to empathize with the terrorist other are, moreover, histrionic. As Leo Strauss classically inquired of this relativist tendency in the social sciences, “is such an understanding dependent upon our own commitment or independent of it?” Strauss explains, if it is independent, I am committed as an actor and I am uncommitted in another compartment of myself in my capacity as a social scientist. “In that latter capacity I am completely empty and therefore completely open to the perception and appreciation of all commitments or value systems.” I go through the process of empathetic understanding in order to reach clarity about my commitment for only a part of me is engaged in my empathetic understanding. This means, however, that “such understanding is not serious or genuine but histrionic.”5 It is also profoundly dependent on Western liberalism. For it is only in an open society that questions the values it promotes that the issue of empathy with the non-Western other could arise. The critical theorist's explicit loathing of the openness that affords her histrionic posturing obscures this constituting fact.

On the basis of this histrionic empathy with the “other,” critical theory concludes that democratic states “do not always abjure acts of terror whether to advance their foreign policy objectives … or to buttress order at home” (p. 73). Consequently, Ken Booth asserts: “If terror can be part of the menu of choice for the relatively strong, it is hardly surprising it becomes a weapon of the relatively weak” (p. 73). Zulaika and Douglass similarly assert that terrorism is “always” a weapon of the weak (p. 33).

At the core of this critical, ethicist, relativism therefore lies a syllogism that holds all violence is terror: Western states use violence, therefore, Western states are terrorist. Further, the greater terrorist uses the greater violence: Western governments exercise the greater violence. Therefore, it is the liberal democracies rather than Al Qaeda that are the greater terrorists.

In its desire to empathize with the transformative ends, if not the means of terrorism generally and Islamist terror in particular, critical theory reveals itself as a form of Marxist unmasking. Thus, for Booth “*terror has multiple forms*” (original italics) and the real terror is economic, the product it would seem of “global capitalism” (p. 75). Only the *engagee* intellectual academic finding in deconstructive criticism the philosophical weapons that reveal the illiberal neo-conservative purpose informing the conventional study of terrorism and the democratic state's prosecution of counterterrorism can identify the real terror lurking behind the “manipulation of the politics of fear” (p. 75).

Moreover, the resolution of this condition of escalating violence requires not any strategic solution that creates security as the basis for development whether in London or Kabul. Instead, Booth, Burke, and the editors contend that the only solution to “the world-historical crisis that is facing human society globally” (p. 76) is universal human “emancipation.” This, according to Burke, is “the normative end” that critical theory pursues. Following Jurgen Habermas, the godfather of critical theory, terrorism is really a form of distorted communication. The solution to this problem of failed communication resides not only in the improvement of living conditions, and “the political taming of unbounded capitalism,” but also in “the telos of mutual understanding.” Only through this telos with its “strong normative bias towards non violence” (p. 43) can a universal condition of peace and justice transform the globe. In other words, the only ethical solution to terrorism is conversation: sitting around an un-coerced table presided over by Kofi Annan, along with Ken Booth, Osama bin Laden, President Obama, and some European Union pacifist sandalista, a transcendental communicative reason will emerge to promulgate norms of transformative justice. As Burke enunciates, the panacea of un-coerced communication would establish “a secularism that might create an enduring architecture of basic shared values” (p. 46).

In the end, un-coerced norm projection is not concerned with the world as it is, but how it ought to be. This not only compounds the logical errors that permeate critical theory, it advances an ultimately utopian agenda under the guise of *soi-disant* cosmopolitanism where one somewhat vaguely recognizes the “human interconnection and mutual vulnerability to nature, the cosmos and each other” (p. 47) and no doubt bursts into spontaneous chanting of Kumbaya.

In analogous visionary terms, Booth defines real security as emancipation in a way that denies any definitional rigor to either term. The struggle against terrorism is, then, a struggle for emancipation from the oppression of political violence everywhere. Consequently, in this Manichean struggle for global emancipation against the real terror of Western democracy, Booth further maintains that universities have a crucial role to play. This also is something of a concern for those who do not share the critical vision, as university international relations departments are not now, it would seem, in business to pursue dispassionate analysis but instead are to serve as cheerleaders for this critically inspired vision.

Overall, the journal's fallacious commitment to emancipation undermines any ostensible claim to pluralism and diversity. Over determined by this transformative approach to world politics, it necessarily denies the possibility of a realist or prudential appreciation of politics and the promotion not of universal solutions but pragmatic ones that accept the best that may be achieved in the circumstances. Ultimately, to present the world how it ought to be rather than as it is conceals a deep intolerance notable in the contempt with which many of the contributors to the journal appear to hold Western politicians and the Western media.6

It is the exploitation of this oughtistic style of thinking that leads the critic into a Humpty Dumpty world where words mean exactly what the critical theorist “chooses them to mean—neither more nor less.” However, in order to justify their disciplinary niche they have to insist on the failure of established modes of terrorism study. Having identified a source of government grants and academic perquisites, critical studies in fact does not deal with the notion of terrorism as such, but instead the manner in which the Western liberal democratic state has supposedly manipulated the use of violence by non-state actors in order to “other” minority communities and create a politics of fear.

Critical Studies and Strategic Theory—A Missed Opportunity

Of course, the doubtful contribution of critical theory by no means implies that all is well with what one might call conventional terrorism studies. The subject area has in the past produced superficial assessments that have done little to contribute to an informed understanding of conflict. This is a point readily conceded by John Horgan and Michael Boyle who put “A Case Against 'Critical Terrorism Studies'” (pp. 51-74). Although they do not seek to challenge the agenda, assumptions, and contradictions inherent in the critical approach, their contribution to the new journal distinguishes itself by actually having a well-organized and well-supported argument. The authors' willingness to acknowledge deficiencies in some terrorism research shows that critical self-reflection is already present in existing terrorism studies. It is ironic, in fact, that the most clearly reflective, original, and *critical* contribution in the first edition should come from established terrorism researchers who critique the critical position.

Interestingly, the specter haunting both conventional and critical terrorism studies is that both assume that terrorism is an existential phenomenon, and thus has causes and solutions. Burke makes this explicit: “The inauguration of this journal,” he declares, “indeed suggests broad agreement that there is a phenomenon called terrorism” (p. 39). Yet this is not the only way of looking at terrorism. For a strategic theorist the notion of terrorism does not exist as an independent phenomenon. It is an abstract noun. More precisely, it is merely a tactic—the creation of fear for political ends—that can be employed by any social actor, be it state or non-state, in any context, without any necessary moral value being involved.

Ironically, then, strategic theory offers a far more “critical perspective on terrorism” than do the perspectives advanced in this journal. Guelke, for example, propounds a curiously orthodox standpoint when he asserts: “to describe an act as one of terrorism, without the qualification of quotation marks to indicate the author's distance from such a judgement, is to condemn it as absolutely illegitimate” (p. 19). If you are a strategic theorist this is an invalid claim. Terrorism is simply a method to achieve an end. Any moral judgment on the act is entirely separate. To fuse the two is a category mistake. In strategic theory, which Guelke ignores, terrorism does not, ipso facto, denote “absolutely illegitimate violence.”

Intriguingly, Stohl, Booth, and Burke also imply that a strategic understanding forms part of their critical viewpoint. Booth, for instance, argues in one of his commandments that terrorism should be seen as a conscious human choice. Few strategic theorists would disagree. Similarly, Burke feels that there does “appear to be a consensus” that terrorism is a “form of instrumental political violence” (p. 38). The problem for the contributors to this volume is that they cannot emancipate themselves from the very orthodox assumption that the word terrorism is pejorative. That may be the popular understanding of the term, but inherently terrorism conveys no necessary connotation of moral condemnation. “Is terrorism a form of warfare, insurgency, struggle, resistance, coercion, atrocity, or great political crime,” Burke asks rhetorically. But once more he misses the point. All violence is instrumental. Grading it according to whether it is insurgency, resistance, or atrocity is irrelevant. Any strategic actor may practice forms of warfare. For this reason Burke's further claim that existing definitions of terrorism have “specifically excluded states as possible perpetrators and privilege them as targets,” is wholly inaccurate (p. 38). Strategic theory has never excluded state-directed terrorism as an object of study, and neither for that matter, as Horgan and Boyle point out, have more conventional studies of terrorism.

Yet, Burke offers—as a critical revelation—that “the strategic intent behind the US bombing of North Vietnam and Cambodia, Israel's bombing of Lebanon, or the sanctions against Iraq is also terrorist.” He continues: “My point is not to remind us that states practise terror, but to show how mainstream *strategic doctrines* are terrorist in these terms and undermine any prospect of achieving the normative consensus if such terrorism is to be reduced and eventually eliminated” (original italics) (p. 41). This is not merely confused, it displays remarkable nescience on the part of one engaged in teaching the next generation of graduates from the Australian Defence Force Academy. Strategic theory conventionally recognizes that actions on the part of state or non-state actors that aim to create fear (such as the allied aerial bombing of Germany in World War II or the nuclear deterrent posture of Mutually Assured Destruction) can be terroristic in nature.7 The problem for critical analysts like Burke is that they impute their own moral valuations to the term terror. Strategic theorists do not. Moreover, the statement that this undermines any prospect that terrorism can be eliminated is illogical: you can never eliminate an abstract noun.

Consequently, those interested in a truly “critical” approach to the subject should perhaps turn to strategic theory for some relief from the strictures that have traditionally governed the study of terrorism, not to self-proclaimed critical theorists who only replicate the flawed understandings of those whom they criticize. Horgan and Boyle conclude their thoughtful article by claiming that critical terrorism studies has more in common with traditional terrorism research than critical theorists would possibly like to admit. These reviewers agree: they are two sides of the same coin.

Conclusion

In the looking glass world of critical terror studies the conventional analysis of terrorism is ontologically challenged, lacks self-reflexivity, and is policy oriented. By contrast, critical theory's ethicist, yet relativist, and deconstructive gaze reveals that we are all terrorists now and must empathize with those sub-state actors who have recourse to violence for whatever motive. Despite their intolerable othering by media and governments, terrorists are really no different from us. In fact, there is terror as the weapon of the weak and the far worse economic and coercive terror of the liberal state. Terrorists therefore deserve empathy and they must be discursively engaged.

At the core of this understanding sits a radical pacifism and an idealism that requires not the status quo but communication and “human emancipation.” Until this radical post-national utopia arrives both force and the discourse of evil must be abandoned and instead therapy and un-coerced conversation must be practiced. In the popular ABC drama *Boston Legal* Judge Brown perennially referred to the vague, irrelevant, jargon-ridden statements of lawyers as “jibber jabber.” The Aberystwyth-based school of critical internationalist utopianism that increasingly dominates the study of international relations in Britain and Australia has refined a higher order incoherence that may be termed Aber jabber. The pages of the journal of *Critical Studies on Terrorism* are its natural home.

No risk of superpower syndrome and their hardline anti-Obama stance only causes backlash

Robert J. Lifton 11, aff guy, 2011, Witness to an Extreme Century: A Memoir, p. 405-406

With all of the American angst during the first year or so of the Obama administration, one may readily forget the power of the historical moment of his election in 2008. BJ and I had a few friends in to watch the returns on the sleek television set in our living room, which we had purchased four years earlier for a similar gathering that had resulted in a roomful of despair and suspicion of fraud in relation to the Bush victory. But this time, in 2008, the television set did not betray us, and my reaction of not just joy but ecstasy, including tears, was hardly mine alone. What was special to me, though, was the quick realization that the outcome meant an end to the country's superpower syndrome. But was that the case? Only partly, it turns out. Certainly Obama and his administration have renounced the principle of American omnipotence in favor of more modest claims about our capacities and influence in the world. Apocalypticism and totalistic behavior have given way to something closer to Camus's "philosophy of limits" with an acceptance of ambiguity, nuance, and complexity. And most important, there has been a specific rejection of nuclearism and a call for abolition of the weapons.

Yet despite all that, the syndrome lingers in crucial areas that specifically connect with my work. Concerning nuclear abolition, Obama has not followed through with clear American policies, despite an impressive convocation of world leaders on the subject of nuclear danger. On revelations of torture, and more recently of illegitimate medical experiments in relation to torture, Obama has mostly tried to sidestep the issue and avoid legal culpability of those involved. Finally, his decision to send added troops to Afghanistan seems to me to be the stuff of war-making, and atrocity-producing, blunder. In all three cases there is a certain clinging to the very American omnipotence being renounced. I have found myself torn between joining a considerable segment of the left in a condemnation of shortcomings that perpetuate elements of the superpower syndrome, and an alternative inclination to defend Obama as an incremental reformer who needs more time.

I took the latter position in a series of discussions with Howard Zinn, who denounced Obama as "a Chicago politician" and a hypocrite. I still don't agree with that judgment but I am also willing to take a public stand of strong opposition to Obama policies on Afghanistan and on American torture and recently revealed experimentation. Yet I remain sensitive as well to the importance of supporting the Obama administration in the face of new waves of right-wing American totalism and potential violence in the backlash over the election of our first African-American president.

Biopolitics not so bad

Dickinson 2004– University of Cincinnati (Edward Ross, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

In short, the continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time are unmistakasble. Both are instances of the “disciplinary society” and of biopolitical, regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more authoritarian states, including the National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example. And it is certainly fruitful to view them from this very broad perspective. But that analysis can easily become superficial and misleading, because it obfuscates the profoundly different strategic and local dynamics of power in the two kinds of regimes. Clearly the democratic welfare state

is not only formally but also substantively quite different from totalitarianism. Above all, again, it has nowhere developed the fateful, radicalizing dynamic that characterized National Socialism (or for that matter Stalinism), the psychotic logic that leads from economistic population management to mass murder. Again, there is always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies. In those cases in which the regime of rights does not successfully produce “health,” such a system can —and historically does— create compulsory programs to enforce it. But again, there are political and policy potentials and constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that are very different from those of National Socialist Germany. Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree of self-direction and participation that is functionally incompatible with authoritarian or totalitarian structures. And this pursuit of biopolitical ends through a regime of democratic citizenship does appear, historically, to have imposed increasingly narrow limits on coercive policies, and to have generated a “logic” or imperative of increasing liberalization. Despite limitations imposed by political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany.90

Of course it is not yet clear whether this is an irreversible dynamic of such systems. Nevertheless, such regimes are characterized by sufficient degrees of autonomy (and of the potential for its expansion) for sufficient numbers of people that I think it becomes useful to conceive of them as productive of a strategic configuration of power relations that might fruitfully be analyzed as a condition of “liberty,” just as much as they are productive of constraint, oppression, or manipulation. At the very least, totalitarianism cannot be the sole orientation point for our understanding of biopolitics, the only end point of the logic of social engineering.

This notion is not at all at odds with the core of Foucauldian (and Peukertian) theory. Democratic welfare states are regimes of power/knowledge no less than early twentieth-century totalitarian states; these systems are not “opposites,” in the sense that they are two alternative ways of organizing the same thing. But they are two very different ways of organizing it. The concept “power” should not be read as a universal stifling night of oppression, manipulation, and entrapment, in which all political and social orders are grey, are essentially or effectively “the same.” Power is a set of social relations, in which individuals and groups have varying degrees of autonomy and effective subjectivity. And discourse is, as Foucault argued, “tactically polyvalent.” Discursive elements (like the various elements of biopolitics) can be combined in different ways to form parts of quite different strategies (like totalitarianism or the democratic welfare state); they cannot be assigned to one place in a structure, but rather circulate. The varying possible constellations of power in modern societies create “multiple modernities,” modern societies with quite radically differing potentials.

Things are getting better

Goldstein, 12/7/11 [Joshua, professor of international relations at American University, National Public Radio, “War and Violence on the Decline in Modern Times”, http://www.npr.org/2011/12/07/143285836/war-and-violence-on-the-decline-in-modern-times]

GOLDSTEIN: Well, think about that war that started 70 years ago, World War II. That was a war in which the levels of violence were 100 times higher than the wars today. And if you measure it, the 1990s were double today. The Cold War years were triple.

So in the United States, we've had a hard decade of war, no doubt about it, and one war is one too many. The things that still happen are heartbreaking and terrible. But overall, the trend is downward. And the big piece of this trend is that the most terrible, destructive wars are between the large national armies with their tank formations and their submarines and airplanes, and nowhere in the world today anymore are two of those large national armies fighting each other head-to-head.

This is a **huge change from history**, when they were fighting each other most of the time, and it means that what we're left with are smaller wars, still terrible but smaller, more limited in size and geographically limited civil wars. And that's a big change.

CONAN: Well, saying that there are fewer war deaths this past decade than at any time in the past 100 years, isn't that another way of indicting the past 100 years and maybe this decade is the anomaly?

GOLDSTEIN: Well, no, because the past 100 years were - there was a big explosion of violence in the early part of the 20th century, but the 17th century was no picnic either. The Thirty Years' War destroyed a third of the population of Germany, and back through history there have been terrible wars much of the time.

And even in prehistoric times, as many as a quarter of the men in a society not infrequently died in wars. So it's actually a new thing and something that's developed in the least 60 years and especially the last 20 years. And we can talk about why it is, and Steven Pinker will have more to say about that also, but the big change is that people are finding other ways to solve their problems, not through war, and we're seeing an actual shrinking in the number of people killed worldwide.

Rule utilitarianism applied to just war theory solves their offense; the alternative is mutually exclusive with their risk calculus which they have to defend

Whitman 7 (Jeffery, Prof of Philosophy, Religion, and Classical Studies Susquehanna University, “Just War Theory and the War on Terrorism A Utilitarian Perspective,” http://www.mesharpe.com/PIN/05Whitman.pdf)

How might the rule-utilitarian perspective for just war theory helpfully inform the war on terrorism? Several potential benefits seem especially salient. The first major advantage that such a perspective lends to the fight against terrorism is that it avoids the temptation to turn the fight into a utopian crusade against evil.27 While it is true that some of the perpetrators of the current terrorism have taken on the nihilistic perspective described earlier (and therefore represent a kind of evil beyond compromise), most of the people who seem to sympathize with their attacks against U.S. and Western interests are not evil people. Many of them have genuine grievances with the polices of Western nations, and their support for terrorism can be weakened or even eliminated if some of those grievances are addressed. Casting the war against global terrorism as a struggle between good and evil would seem to invoke a fight-to-the-death struggle, but seeing the struggle in this way defies the reality of the situation, a reality better addressed in utilitarian terms. While there can be no compromise between good and evil, a more nuanced understanding of what motivates support for Islamic terrorism (e.g., the real or perceived bias of U.S. policy against Arab and Muslim interests) would show that not all of our foes are part of some undifferentiated evil. Recognizing this fact would enable us to recognize that moral considerations place limits on the use of military force—in terms of both means and ends—in prosecuting this war. And these limits can be best applied through the tenets of just war theory supported by a ruleutilitarian foundation. The struggle against terrorism will be a long struggle, and it will require the kind of balancing of means to ends that the utilitarian calculus promotes. The proper goal in the end is not the complete destruction of all terrorist groups and their supporters (as if such a goal were even possible). Instead, the goal must be more moderate, though no less challenging. Quoting Joseph Boyle. The state of affairs in which the prospect of terrorist activity is not a serious threat to people’s conduct of their lives but part of the disagreeable but acceptable risks of modern life is a reasonable public goal in relationship to terrorism generally, as it is in relationship to criminal activity more generally. (2003, 168)

Ethical obligations are tautological—the only coherent rubric is to maximize number of lives saved

Greene 2010 – Associate Professor of the Social Sciences Department of Psychology Harvard University (Joshua, Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings, “The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul”, [www.fed.cuhk.edu.hk/~lchang/material/Evolutionary/Developmental/Greene-KantSoul.pdf](http://www.fed.cuhk.edu.hk/~lchang/material/Evolutionary/Developmental/Greene-KantSoul.pdf), WEA)

What turn-of-the-millennium science is telling us is that human moral judgment is not a pristine rational enterprise, that our moral judgments are driven by a hodgepodge of emotional dispositions, which themselves were shaped by a hodgepodge of evolutionary forces, both biological and cultural. Because of this, it is exceedingly unlikely that there is anyrationallycoherentnormativemoral theory that can accommodateourmoral intuitions. Moreover, anyone who claims to have such a theory, or even part of one, almost certainly doesn't. Instead, what that person probably has is a moral rationalization. It seems then, that we have somehow crossed the infamous "is"-"ought" divide. How did this happen? Didn't Hume (Hume, 1978) and Moore (Moore, 1966) warn us against trying to derive an "ought" from and "is?" How did we go from descriptive scientific theories concerning moral psychology to skepticism about a whole class of normative moral theories? The answer is that we did not, as Hume and Moore anticipated, attempt to derive an "ought" from and "is." That is, our method has been inductive rather than deductive. We have inferred on the basis of the available evidence that the phenomenon of rationalist deontological philosophy is best explained as a rationalization of evolved emotional intuition (Harman, 1977). Missing the Deontological Point I suspect that rationalist deontologists will remain unmoved by the arguments presented here. Instead, I suspect, they will insist that I have simply misunderstoodwhatKant and like-minded deontologistsare all about. Deontology, they will say, isn't about this intuition or that intuition. It's not defined by its normative differences with consequentialism. Rather, deontology is about taking humanity seriously. Above all else, it's about respect for persons. It's about treating others as fellow rational creatures rather than as mere objects, about acting for reasons rational beings can share. And so on (Korsgaard, 1996a; Korsgaard, 1996b).This is, no doubt, how many deontologists see deontology. But this insider's view, as I've suggested, may be misleading. The problem, more specifically, is that it defines deontology in terms of values that are notdistinctivelydeontological, though they may appear to be from the inside. Consider the following analogy with religion. When one asks a religious person to explain the essence of his religion, one often gets an answer like this: "It's about love, really. It's about looking out for other people, looking beyond oneself. It's about community, being part of something larger than oneself." This sort of answer accurately captures the phenomenology of many people's religion, but it's nevertheless inadequate for distinguishing religion from other things. This is because many, if not most, non-religious people aspire to love deeply, look out for other people, avoid self-absorption, have a sense of a community, and be connected to things larger than themselves. In other words, secular humanists and atheists can assent to most of what many religious people think religion is all about. From a secular humanist's point of view, in contrast, what's distinctive about religion is its commitment to the existence of supernatural entities as well as formal religious institutions and doctrines. And they're right. These things really do distinguish religious from non-religious practices, though they may appear to be secondary to many people operating from within a religious point of view. In the same way, I believe that most of the standard deontological/Kantian self-characterizatons fail to distinguish deontology from other approaches to ethics. (See also Kagan (Kagan, 1997, pp. 70-78.) on the difficulty of defining deontology.) It seems to me that consequentialists, as much as anyone else, have respect for persons, are against treating people asmereobjects, wish to act for reasons that rational creatures can share, etc. A consequentialist respects other persons, and refrains from treating them as mere objects, by counting every person's well-beingin the decision-making process. Likewise, a consequentialist attempts to act according to reasons that rational creatures can share by acting according to principles that give equal weight to everyone's interests, i.e. that are impartial. This is not to say that consequentialists and deontologists don't differ. They do. It's just that the real differences may not be what deontologists often take them to be. What, then, distinguishes deontology from other kinds of moral thought? A good strategy for answering this question is to start with concrete disagreements between deontologists and others (such as consequentialists) and then work backward in search of deeper principles. This is what I've attempted to do with the trolley and footbridge cases, and other instances in which deontologists and consequentialists disagree. If you ask a deontologically-minded person why it's wrong to push someone in front of speeding trolley in order to save five others, you will getcharacteristically deontological answers. Some will betautological: "Because it's murder!"Others will be more sophisticated: "The ends don't justify the means." "You have to respect people's rights." But, as we know, these answers don't really explain anything, because if you give the same people (on different occasions) the trolley case or the loop case (See above), they'll make the opposite judgment, even though their initial explanation concerning the footbridge case applies equally well to one or both of these cases. Talk about rights, respect for persons, and reasons we can share are natural attempts to explain, in "cognitive" terms, what we feel when we find ourselves having emotionally driven intuitions that are odds with the cold calculus of consequentialism. Although these explanations are inevitably incomplete, there seems to be "something deeply right" about thembecause they give voice to powerful moral emotions. But, as with many religious people's accounts of what's essential to religion, they don't really explain what's distinctive about the philosophy in question.

No risk of runaway interventions

**Weiner 2007**

Michael Anthony, J.D. Candidate, Vanderbilt School of Law, 2007, “A Paper Tiger with Bite: A Defense of the War Powers Resolution,” http://www.vanderbilt.edu/jotl/manage/wp-content/uploads/Weiner.pdf

IV. CONCLUSION: THE EXONERATED WPR AND THE WOLF IN SHEEP'S CLOTHING The WPR is an effective piece of war powers legislation. As Part III made clear, no presidential unilateral use of force since 1973 has developed into a conflict that in any way resembles the WPR's impetus, Vietnam. Rather, the great majority of these conflicts have been characterized by their brevity, safety, and downright success. Yes, there have been tragic outcomes in Lebanon and Somalia; but what happened in response to those tragedies? In Lebanon, President Reagan actually submitted to being Congress's "messengerboy," 203 asking for its permission, per the WPR, to continue the operation. And in Somalia, at the first sight of a looming disaster, it was President Clinton who cut short the operation. Thus, from 1973 on, it is easy to argue that sitting Executives have made responsible use of their power to act unilaterally in the foreign affairs realm. The WPR has even contributed to a congressional resurgence in the foreign affairs arena. In many of these conflicts, we have seen Congress conducting numerous votes on whether and how it should respond to a unilaterally warring Executive. In some of the conflicts, Congress has come close to invoking the WPR against rather impetuous Executives. 20 4 In Lebanon, Congress actually succeeded in the task.20 5 It is this Note's contention, though, that even when Congress failed to legally invoke the WPR, these votes had normative effects on the Executives in power. Such votes demonstrate that Congress desires to be, and will try to be, a player in foreign affairs decisions. So, perhaps the enactment of the WPR, the rise of Congress (at least in the normative sense) and the successful string of unilateral presidential uses of force are just a series of coincidences. This Note, however, with common sense as its companion, contends that they are not. Rather, it is self-evident that the WPR has played a significant role in improving the implementation of presidential unilateral uses of force.

No risk of tyranny

Rosman 96 [Michael E. Rosman (General Counsel @ Center for Individual Rights; JD from Yale); Review of “FIGHTING WORDS: INDIVIDUALS, COMMUNITIES AND LIBERTIES OF SPEECH”; Constitutional Commentary 96 (Winter, p. 343-345)]

Of course, the other branches also shove at the boundaries of branch power--FDR's Court-packing plan being one notable example of this practice. Sometimes the law of unintended consequences grabs hold. Perhaps the Court-packing plan concentrated the Justices' minds on finding ways to hold New Deal legislation constitutional, but it also blew up in FDR's face politically.

At least for the last two hundred years, however, no branch has managed to expand its power to the point of delivering an obvious knock-out blow to another branch. Seen from this broader perspective, cases such as Morrison,(33) Bowsher v. Synar,(34) and Mistretta v. United States(35) surely alter the balance of branch power at a given historical moment, but do not change the fundamental and brute fact that the Constitution puts three institutional heavyweights into a ring where they are free to bash each other.

Judicialocentrism tends to obscure this obvious point because it causes people to dwell on the hard cases that reach the Supreme Court. The power of separation of powers, however, largely resides in its ability to keep the easy cases from ever occurring. For instance, Congress, although it tries to weaken the President from time to time, has not tried to reduce the President to a ceremonial figurehead a la the Queen of England. Similarly, Congress does not make a habit of trying cases that have been heard by the courts. This list could be continued indefinitely.

The Supreme Court has had two hundred years to muck about with separation-of-powers doctrine. Over that time, scores of Justices--each with his or her own somewhat idiosyncratic view of the law--have sat on the bench. Scholars have denounced separation-of-powers jurisprudence as a mess. But the Republic endures, at least more or less. These historical facts tend to indicate that the Court need not rush to change its approach to separation of powers to prevent a slide into tyranny.

# WAZHIR WAS THE 2N

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#### Topical fairness requirements are key to effective dialogue—monopolizing strategy and prep makes the discussion one-sided and subverts any meaningful neg role

Galloway 7—Samford Comm prof (Ryan, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007)

Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure. Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table. When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. **Far from** being **a banal request for links** to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon **months of preparation**, research, and critical thinking not be silenced. Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms **operate to exclude** particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning: Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197). **Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation** (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. **Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits** of topical advocacy.

### Link Wall

#### They wreck state legitimacy – eviscerates effectiveness

GITLIN 2003 (Todd, Prof of Sociology and Journalism at Colombia, Letters to a Young Activist, p. 140-142)

Whatever is to come, you and I need to think long and hard about how this is our war and how it is not. Skepticism is healthy; knee-jerking opposition isn’t. Against the patriotism of cheerleading, we dare not sign onto every raid against liberty and every armed attack the authorities propose. But it is unconscionable—and self-defeating to boot—to say that security is someone else’s problem, as it is wrong to declare unthinkingly that recourse to proportionate force cannot be just. The terrorists of September 11 were not the present-day reincarnations of Vietnamese Communists, who only hysterics thought were posed to climb ashore the beaches of San Diego. The Islamist murderers, though, did come ashore to annihilate as many American lives as feasible, heedless of the suffering they inflicted—or rather, reveling in that suffering, as proof of their righteousness—and they are committed to coming ashore again. Any movement that does not take seriously—not perfunctorily, not rhetorically but seriously—the need to protect Americans from murderous assaults of this magnitude does not deserve a hearing and will not get one. Generals, it is said, are always planning to fight the last war—but they’re not alone in suffering from sentimentality, blindness and mental laziness disguised as resolve. Antiwar movements are bound, against all emotional comforts of repetition, to see the world freshly. A narrow-minded antiwar movement helps no one when it mires itself in its own mirror-image myths. Those who evade the difficulties in their purist positions and refuse to face *all* the mess and danger of reality only guarantee their bitter inconsequence. Moral and practical traps lie on every side. So let’s pick our way carefully. We’ve lit out for new territory. Here’s the problem in a nutshell: In revulsion against the worst your government does, you’ll be tempted to renounce your country. In revolt against the smug and bullying who praise America by telling you to shut up, you’ll be tempted to skip the praise. Refusing to praise the America that the authoritarians tell you to praise—just because it’s they who have told you to do the praising—is infantile. (Eat your peas! Nnnooo!) The preordained no is a kind of submission. In the words of the American humorist Don Marquis, “An idea isn’t responsible for the people who believe in it,” and the same is true of a nation-state, even a powerful one, for people of many different opinions share membership in it. Disconcerting news for the purist; but the purist doesn’t belong in politics. A purist who wishes to make the world better should design a beautiful object or leap into the stands to catch a fly ball or cook a sumptuous meal. Politics, a feat of collaboration, is something different. Without disconcerting bedfellows there is no politics—unless you are a totalist, in which case what you really want is the death of conflict, the death of difference—the death, really, of politics.

#### Second — surrenders to the terrorists – that causes more terrorism – only a full war can solve

Ghate 2004, ONKAR GHATEa resident fellow at the Ayn Rand Institute where he teaches in the Institute’s Objectivist Academic Center. He has lectured on philosophy and Objectivism throughout North America, 2004, “Diverting the Blame for September 11th”, http://capitalismmagazine.com/2004/04/diverting-the-blame-for-september-11th/

The squabbling and finger-pointing surrounding the 9/11 commission only serve to obscure the fundamental lesson of that horrific day. Whatever errors or incompetence on the part of a particular individual or intelligence agency, what made September 11 possible was a failure of policy. Our government, whether controlled by Democrat or Republican, had for decades conducted an accommodating, range-of-the-moment, unprincipled foreign policy.¶ September 11 was not the first time America was attacked by Islamic fundamentalists engaged in “holy war” against us. In 1979 theocratic Iran–which has spearheaded the “Islamic Revolution”–stormed the U.S. embassy in Tehran and held 54 Americans hostage for over a year. In 1983 the Syrian- and Iranian-backed group Hezbollah bombed a U.S. marine barracks in Lebanon, killing 241 servicemen while they slept; the explosives came from Yasser Arafat’s Fatah movement. In 1998 al-Qaeda blew up the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 224 individuals. In 2000 al-Qaeda bombed the USS Cole in Yemen, killing 17 sailors.¶ So we already knew that al-Qaeda was actively engaged in attacking Americans. We even had evidence that agents connected to al-Qaeda had been responsible for the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. And we knew in 1996 that bin Laden had made an overt declaration of war against the “Satan” America.¶ But how did America react? Did our government adopt a principled approach and identify the fact that we were faced with a deadly threat from an ideological foe? Did we launch systematic counterattacks to wipe out such enemy organizations as al-Qaeda, Hezbollah and Fatah? Did we seek to eliminate enemy states like Iran? No–our responses were short-sighted and self-contradictory.¶ To cite only a few of depressingly many examples: we initially expelled Iranian diplomats–but later sought an appeasing rapprochement with that ayatollah-led government. We intermittently cut off trade with Iran–but secretly negotiated weapons-for-hostages deals. When Israel had the courage to enter Lebanon in 1982 to destroy the PLO, we refused to uncompromisingly support our ally and instead brokered the killers’ release. And with respect to al-Qaeda, we dropped a perfunctory bomb or two on one of its suspected camps, while our compliant diplomats waited for al-Qaeda’s terrorist attacks to fade from the headlines.¶ At home we treated our attackers as if they were isolated criminals rather than soldiers engaged in battle against us. In 1941 we did not attempt to indict the Japanese pilots who bombed Pearl Harbor–we declared war on the source. Yet we spent millions trying to indict specific terrorists–while we ignored their masters.¶ Despite emphatic pronouncements from Islamic leaders about a “jihad” against America, our political leaders failed to grasp the ideology that seeks our destruction. This left them unable to target that enemy’s armed combatants–in Palestine, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia–and the governments that assist them.¶ Is it any wonder then that, although our intelligence agencies prevented many planned attacks, they could not prevent them all?¶ Tragically, little has changed since September 11. Our government’s actions remain hopelessly unprincipled. Despite the Bush administration’s rhetoric about ending states that sponsor terrorism, President Bush has left the most dangerous of these–Iran–untouched, while his officials periodically seek “rapprochement” and work with Iranian officials to foster “religious values” at U.N. conferences. The attack on Iraq, though capable of justification, was hardly a priority in our war against militant Islam. And because the war was waged with no view to the long term, Iraq is in danger of slipping into the hands of Shiite clerics and other militant Islamic leaders–and thus of becoming even more of a threat than it was.¶ Moreover, when Bush does strike at a militant Islamic regime, he does so only haltingly. He stresses that the conflict is not ideological and, morally unsure of his right to protect American lives by force, cowers before any sign of world disapproval over civilian casualties. The result was that he reined in the military forces in Afghanistan and allowed numerous Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters to escape.¶ Elsewhere in the Mideast, Bush continues to play by a double standard. His administration scolds Israel for killing its own bin Laden, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, while Bush pretends that the Palestinians and Islamic militants attacking Israel–and who have attacked Americans in the past and will no doubt try again in the future–are, somehow, different from al-Qaeda and deserving of a “peace” plan.¶ And now, both Republicans and Democrats wage a domestic war, senselessly and desperately trying to find a fall guy for September 11. Thus, too unprincipled to identify the enemy and wage all-out war, but not yet completely blind to their own ineffectualness, leaders from both parties resignedly admit that we’re in for a “long war” and that there will be more terrorists attacks on U.S. soil.¶ The lesson to learn from September 11 is this. We must root out the amoral, pragmatic expediency that dominates our government’s foreign policy and replace it with the principles of self-interest.

#### Saga foundation tooooo good

### AT: Construction Bad

#### There is a clear line – we are freedom fighters they are totalitarian islamisists

Schwartz 2002, Peter Schwartz, author of The Foreign Policy of Self-Interest, is a distinguished fellow at the Ayn Rand Institute in Irvine, Calif. The Institute promotes Objectivism, the philosophy of Ayn Rand--author of Atlas Shrugged and The Fountainhead. 2002, “War and Morality”, http://www.aynrand.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=8016&news\_iv\_ctrl=1064

Any dictatorship that has the capability, and has demonstrated the willingness, to attack America's interests, is a threat that deserves to be eliminated. The justification for war is not some amoral calculation about geopolitical "balances of power." The only justification is a moral one--and the only nation entitled to invoke it is one that upholds freedom. In a battle between gangsters, both sides are wrong; in a battle between tyranny and freedom, it is the proponents of the latter who are in the right. Saddam Hussein is an enemy, potential or actual, of every free country in the world. The outlaw-state of Iraq has no right to its "territorial integrity"--any more than did the Taliban in Afghanistan or the Nazis in Germany.¶ We all recognize the objective difference between criminals and the police. The fact that both parties carry weapons does not make it difficult to evaluate the one as a threat to our rights and the other as a protector of those rights. The same applies to countries: dictatorships are criminal states, while the government of a free country is the police who uses force to defend its citizens against those criminals. The moral distinction between the initiator and the retaliator is obvious to everyone except our diplomats (and our intellectuals). Passing moral judgment is the one act they seek to avoid. "Who are we to judge," they declare amorally--leaving conflicts to be resolved through pragmatic horse-trading and arm-twisting.¶ But making moral judgments is the basic requirement of an effective foreign policy. We need to identify the danger posed to the value of human life and human liberty by certain regimes. The government of Iran, for example, which is the wellspring of world terrorism, is a physical threat to America and should be militarily subdued. The same goal applies to other aggressor countries that are demonstrable threats to the safety of Americans.

### AT: Ethnocentrism

#### Ethnocentrism is precognitive and universal across cultures- inside/outside inevitably structures IR

ROSS A. **HAMMOND** Department of Political Science University of Michigan, Ann Arbor **AND** ROBERT **AXELROD** Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, The Evolution of Ethnocentrism, *Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol 5 No 6 2006

Ethnocentrism is a nearly universal syndrome of discriminatory attitudes and behaviors (Sumner 1906; LeVine and Campbell 1972). The attitudes include seeing one’s own group (the in-group) as virtuous and superior, one’s own standards of value as universal, and out-groups as contemptible and inferior. Behaviors associated with ethnocentrism include cooperative relations within the group and the absence of cooperative relations with out-groups (LeVine and Campbell 1972). Ethnocentric behaviors are based on group boundaries that are typically defined by one or more observable characteristics (such as language, accent, physical features, or religion) regarded as indicating common descent (Sumner 1906; Hirschfeld 1996; Kurzban, Tooby, and Cosmides 2001). Such behaviors often also have a strong territorial component (Sumner 1906). Ethnocentrism has been implicated not only in ethnic conflict (Brewer 1979; Chirot and Seligman 2001), instability of democratic institutions (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972), and war (van der Dennen 1995) but also in consumer choice (Klein and Ettenson 1999) and voting (Kinder 1998). Although ethnocentrism is sometimes used to refer to a wide range of discriminatory behaviors, we will focus on ethnocentric behavior defined as in-group favoritism. This definition is consistent with research in anthropology and psychology that differentiates, both empirically and causally, between in-group favoritism (“ethnocentrism”) and out-group hostility (“xenophobia”) (Ray and Lovejoy 1986; Struch and Schwartz 1989; Cashdan 2001; Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis 2002; Brown 2004). Ethnocentrism is generally thought to involve substantial cognitive ability in individuals (Sumner 1906; Simmel 1955; Sherif and Sherif 1956; Sherif 1966; LeVine and Campbell 1972; Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis 2002) and to be based on complex social and cultural inputs. While such factors certainly play a role in much ethnocentric behavior, extensive empirical evidence from psychology suggests the prevalence of a strong individual predisposition toward bias in favor of in-groups, which can be observed even when cognition is minimal and social input very abstract. Laboratory results, for example, suggest that behaviors of in-group favoritism can be easily triggered by even the most trivial and arbitrary group definitions (Tajfel 1970; Tajfel et al. 1971). Behaviors favoring in-groups are also found to be widespread even when they are individually costly and even in the absence of opportunities for reciprocity or direct self-interested gain (Ferguson and Kelley 1964; Kramer and Brewer 1984; Brewer and Kramer 1986). Studies in cognitive psychology find that categorization and discrimination based on group boundaries is often rapid and even preconscious (Dovidio and Gaertner 1993; Lamont and Molnar 2002). (926-7)

## Case

### Finishing Jackson

#### CTS is incoherent – Jones and Smith destroy their ev – their authors are overly hyperbolic and incorrectly assume that the State is wholly responsible for terrorism – all of their generic academia arguments cut both ways – their authors inflate bias in order to fulfill their indicts and miss the boat on a constructive definition of terrorist

Overall, the journal's fallacious commitment to emancipation undermines any ostensible claim to pluralism and diversity. Over determined by this transformative approach to world politics, it necessarily denies the possibility of a realist or prudential appreciation of politics and the promotion not of universal solutions but pragmatic ones that accept the best that may be achieved in the circumstances. Ultimately, to present the world how it ought to be rather than as it is conceals a deep intolerance notable in the contempt with which many of the contributors to the journal appear to hold Western politicians and the Western media.6

It is the exploitation of this oughtistic style of thinking that leads the critic into a Humpty Dumpty world where words mean exactly what the critical theorist “chooses them to mean—neither more nor less.” However, in order to justify their disciplinary niche they have to insist on the failure of established modes of terrorism study. Having identified a source of government grants and academic perquisites, critical studies in fact does not deal with the notion of terrorism as such, but instead the manner in which the Western liberal democratic state has supposedly manipulated the use of violence by non-state actors in order to “other” minority communities and create a politics of fear.

Critical Studies and Strategic Theory—A Missed Opportunity

Of course, the doubtful contribution of critical theory by no means implies that all is well with what one might call conventional terrorism studies. The subject area has in the past produced superficial assessments that have done little to contribute to an informed understanding of conflict. This is a point readily conceded by John Horgan and Michael Boyle who put “A Case Against 'Critical Terrorism Studies'” (pp. 51-74). Although they do not seek to challenge the agenda, assumptions, and contradictions inherent in the critical approach, their contribution to the new journal distinguishes itself by actually having a well-organized and well-supported argument. The authors' willingness to acknowledge deficiencies in some terrorism research shows that critical self-reflection is already present in existing terrorism studies. It is ironic, in fact, that the most clearly reflective, original, and *critical* contribution in the first edition should come from established terrorism researchers who critique the critical position.

Interestingly, the specter haunting both conventional and critical terrorism studies is that both assume that terrorism is an existential phenomenon, and thus has causes and solutions. Burke makes this explicit: “The inauguration of this journal,” he declares, “indeed suggests broad agreement that there is a phenomenon called terrorism” (p. 39). Yet this is not the only way of looking at terrorism. For a strategic theorist the notion of terrorism does not exist as an independent phenomenon. It is an abstract noun. More precisely, it is merely a tactic—the creation of fear for political ends—that can be employed by any social actor, be it state or non-state, in any context, without any necessary moral value being involved.

Ironically, then, strategic theory offers a far more “critical perspective on terrorism” than do the perspectives advanced in this journal. Guelke, for example, propounds a curiously orthodox standpoint when he asserts: “to describe an act as one of terrorism, without the qualification of quotation marks to indicate the author's distance from such a judgement, is to condemn it as absolutely illegitimate” (p. 19). If you are a strategic theorist this is an invalid claim. Terrorism is simply a method to achieve an end. Any moral judgment on the act is entirely separate. To fuse the two is a category mistake. In strategic theory, which Guelke ignores, terrorism does not, ipso facto, denote “absolutely illegitimate violence.”

Intriguingly, Stohl, Booth, and Burke also imply that a strategic understanding forms part of their critical viewpoint. Booth, for instance, argues in one of his commandments that terrorism should be seen as a conscious human choice. Few strategic theorists would disagree. Similarly, Burke feels that there does “appear to be a consensus” that terrorism is a “form of instrumental political violence” (p. 38). The problem for the contributors to this volume is that they cannot emancipate themselves from the very orthodox assumption that the word terrorism is pejorative. That may be the popular understanding of the term, but inherently terrorism conveys no necessary connotation of moral condemnation. “Is terrorism a form of warfare, insurgency, struggle, resistance, coercion, atrocity, or great political crime,” Burke asks rhetorically. But once more he misses the point. All violence is instrumental. Grading it according to whether it is insurgency, resistance, or atrocity is irrelevant. Any strategic actor may practice forms of warfare. For this reason Burke's further claim that existing definitions of terrorism have “specifically excluded states as possible perpetrators and privilege them as targets,” is wholly inaccurate (p. 38). Strategic theory has never excluded state-directed terrorism as an object of study, and neither for that matter, as Horgan and Boyle point out, have more conventional studies of terrorism.

Yet, Burke offers—as a critical revelation—that “the strategic intent behind the US bombing of North Vietnam and Cambodia, Israel's bombing of Lebanon, or the sanctions against Iraq is also terrorist.” He continues: “My point is not to remind us that states practise terror, but to show how mainstream *strategic doctrines* are terrorist in these terms and undermine any prospect of achieving the normative consensus if such terrorism is to be reduced and eventually eliminated” (original italics) (p. 41). This is not merely confused, it displays remarkable nescience on the part of one engaged in teaching the next generation of graduates from the Australian Defence Force Academy. Strategic theory conventionally recognizes that actions on the part of state or non-state actors that aim to create fear (such as the allied aerial bombing of Germany in World War II or the nuclear deterrent posture of Mutually Assured Destruction) can be terroristic in nature.7 The problem for critical analysts like Burke is that they impute their own moral valuations to the term terror. Strategic theorists do not. Moreover, the statement that this undermines any prospect that terrorism can be eliminated is illogical: you can never eliminate an abstract noun.

Consequently, those interested in a truly “critical” approach to the subject should perhaps turn to strategic theory for some relief from the strictures that have traditionally governed the study of terrorism, not to self-proclaimed critical theorists who only replicate the flawed understandings of those whom they criticize. Horgan and Boyle conclude their thoughtful article by claiming that critical terrorism studies has more in common with traditional terrorism research than critical theorists would possibly like to admit. These reviewers agree: they are two sides of the same coin.

Conclusion

In the looking glass world of critical terror studies the conventional analysis of terrorism is ontologically challenged, lacks self-reflexivity, and is policy oriented. By contrast, critical theory's ethicist, yet relativist, and deconstructive gaze reveals that we are all terrorists now and must empathize with those sub-state actors who have recourse to violence for whatever motive. Despite their intolerable othering by media and governments, terrorists are really no different from us. In fact, there is terror as the weapon of the weak and the far worse economic and coercive terror of the liberal state. Terrorists therefore deserve empathy and they must be discursively engaged.

At the core of this understanding sits a radical pacifism and an idealism that requires not the status quo but communication and “human emancipation.” Until this radical post-national utopia arrives both force and the discourse of evil must be abandoned and instead therapy and un-coerced conversation must be practiced. In the popular ABC drama *Boston Legal* Judge Brown perennially referred to the vague, irrelevant, jargon-ridden statements of lawyers as “jibber jabber.” The Aberystwyth-based school of critical internationalist utopianism that increasingly dominates the study of international relations in Britain and Australia has refined a higher order incoherence that may be termed Aber jabber. The pages of the journal of *Critical Studies on Terrorism* are its natural home.

#### Claims of bias are overstated generalizations – evaluate arguments on their merits

Michael J. Boyle '8, School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, and John Horgan, International Center for the Study of Terrorism, Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University, April 2008, “A Case Against Critical Terrorism Studies,” Critical Studies On Terrorism, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 51-64

One of the tensions within CTS concerns the issue of ‘policy relevance’. At the most basic level, **there are some sweeping generalizations made by CTS scholars, often with little evidence**. For example, Jackson (2007c) describes ‘the core terrorism scholars’ (without explicitly saying who he is referring to) as ‘intimately connected – institutionally, financially, politically, and ideologically – with a state hegemonic project’ (p. 245). **Without giving any details of who these ‘core’ scholars are, where they are, what they do, and exactly who funds them, his arguments are tantamount to conjecture at best. We do not deny that governments fund terrorism research and terrorism researchers, and that this can influence the direction** (and even the findings) of the research. But **we are suspicious of over-generalizations of this count on two grounds: (1) accepting government funding or information does not necessarily obviate one’s independent scholarly judgment in a particular project; and (2) having policy relevance is not always a sin**. On the first point, we are in agreement with some CTS scholars. Gunning provides a sensitive analysis of this problem, and calls on CTS advocates to come to terms with how they can engage policy-makers without losing their critical distance. He recognizes that CTS can (and should) aim to be policy-relevant, but perhaps to a different audience, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society than just governments and security services. In other words, CTS aims to whisper into the ear of the prince, but it is just a different prince.

Gunning (2007a) also argues that **research should be assessed on its own merits, for ‘just because a piece of research comes from RAND does not invalidate it; conversely, a “critical” study is not inherently good’** (p. 240). We agree entirely with this. Not all sponsored or contract research is made to ‘toe a party line’, and **much of the work coming out of** official **government agencies** or affiliated government agencies **has little agenda and can be** analytically **useful. The task of the scholar is to retain one’s sense of critical judgment and integrity, and we believe that there is no prima facie reason to assume that this cannot be done in sponsored research projects**. What matters here are the details of the research – what is the purpose of the work, how will it be done, how might the work be used in policy – and for these questions the scholar must be self-critical and insistent on their intellectual autonomy. The scholar must also be mindful of the responsibility they bear for shaping a government’s response to the problem of terrorism. **Nothing – not the source of the funding, purpose of the research or prior empirical or theoretical commitment – obviates the need of the scholar to consider his or her own conscience carefully when engaging in work with any external actor. But simply engaging with governments on discrete projects does not make one an ‘embedded expert’ nor does it imply sanction to their actions**. But we also believe that the **study of political violence lends itself to policy relevance and** that **those who seek to produce research that might help policy-makers reduce the rates of terrorist attack are committing no sin**, provided that they retain their independent judgment and report their findings candidly and honestly. In the case of terrorism, we would go further to argue that being policy relevant is in some instances an entirely justifiable moral choice. For example, neither of us has any problem producing research with a morally defensible but policy relevant goal (for example, helping the British government to prevent suicide bombers from attacking the London Underground) and we do not believe that engaging in such work tarnishes one’s stature as an independent scholar. **Implicit in the CTS literature is a deep suspicion about the state** and those who engage with it. **Such a suspicion may blind some CTS scholars to good work** done by those associated with the state. But to assume that being ‘embedded’ in an institution linked to the ‘establishment’ consists of being captured by a state hegemonic project is too simple. We do not believe that scholars studying terrorism must all be policy-relevant, but equally we do not believe that being policy relevant should always be interpreted as writing a blank cheque for governments or as necessarily implicating the scholar in the behaviour of that government on issues unrelated to one’s work. Working for the US government, for instance, does not imply that the scholar sanctions or approves of the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison. **The assumption that those who do not practice CTS are all ‘embedded’ with the ‘establishment’ and that this somehow gives the green light for states to engage in illegal activity is in our view unwarranted, to say the very least.**

### AT: Discursive Othering

#### Discursive othering doesn’t result in ‘uncontrollable violence’

Rodwell 5 (Jonathan Rodwell is a PhD student at Manchester Met. researching the U.S. Foreign Policy of the late 70's / rise of ‘neo-cons’ and Second Cold War, “Trendy But Empty: A Response to Richard Jackson,” http://www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue15/rodwell1.htm)

To be specific if the U.S. and every other nation is continually reproducing identities through ‘othering’ it is a constant and universal phenomenon that fails to help us understand at all why one result of the othering turned out one way and differently at another time. For example, how could one explain how the process resulted in the 2003 invasion of Iraq but didn’t produce a similar invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 when that country (and by the logic of the Regan administrations discourse) the West was threatened by the ‘Evil Empire’. By the logical of discourse analysis in both cases these policies were the result of politicians being able to discipline and control the political agenda to produce the outcomes. So why were the outcomes not the same? To reiterate the point how do we explain that the language of the War on Terror actually managed to result in the eventual Afghan invasion in 2002? Surely it is impossible to explain how George W. Bush was able to convince his people (and incidentally the U.N and Nato) to support a war in Afghanistan without referring to a simple fact outside of the discourse; the fact that a known terrorist in Afghanistan actually admitted to the murder of thousands of people on the 11h of Sepetember 2001. The point is that if the discursive ‘othering’ of an ‘alien’ people or group is what really gave the U.S. the opportunity to persue the war in Afghanistan one must surly wonder why Afghanistan. Why not North Korea? Or Scotland? If the discourse is so powerfully useful in it’s own right why could it not have happened anywhere at any time and more often? Why could the British government not have been able to justify an armed invasion and regime change in Northern Ireland throughout the terrorist violence of the 1980’s? Surely they could have just employed the same discursive trickery as George W. Bush? Jackson is absolutely right when he points out that the actuall threat posed by Afghanistan or Iraq today may have been thoroughly misguided and conflated and that there must be more to explain why those wars were enacted at that time. Unfortunately that explanation cannot simply come from the result of inscripting identity and discourse. On top of this there is the clear problem that the consequences of the discursive othering are not necessarily what Jackson would seem to identify. This is a problem consistent through David Campbell’s original work on which Jackson’s approach is based[iii]. David Campbell argued for a linguistic process that ‘always results in an other being marginalized’ or has the potential for ‘demonisation’[iv]. At the same time Jackson, building upon this, maintains without qualification that the systematic and institutionalised abuse of Iraqi prisoners first exposed in April 2004 “is a direct consequence of the language used by senior administration officials: conceiving of terrorist suspects as ‘evil’, ‘inhuman’ and ‘faceless enemies of freedom creates an atmosphere where abuses become normalised and tolerated”[v]. The only problem is that the process of differentiation does not actually necessarily produce dislike or antagonism. In the 1940’s and 50’s even subjected to the language of the ‘Red Scare’ it’s obvious not all Americans came to see the Soviets as an ‘other’ of their nightmares. And in Iraq the abuses of Iraqi prisoners are isolated cases, it is not the case that the U.S. militarily summarily abuses prisoners as a result of language. Surely the massive protest against the war, even in the U.S. itself, is also a self evident example that the language of ‘evil’ and ‘inhumanity’ does not necessarily produce an outcome that marginalises or demonises an ‘other’. Indeed one of the points of discourse is that we are continually differentiating ourselves from all others around us without this necessarily leading us to hate fear or abuse anyone.[vi] Consequently, the clear fear of the Soviet Union during the height of the Cold War, and the abuses at Abu Ghirab are unusual cases. To understand what is going on we must ask how far can the process of inscripting identity really go towards explaining them? As a result at best all discourse analysis provides us with is a set of universals and a heuristic model

#### Yes, the war on terror will go on for a long time – this isn’t a reason to give up and will be true regardless of our strategy

**Peters, 2002**

Ralph, retired Army officer and the author of 19 books, as well as of hundreds of essays and articles, experience, military or civilian, in 60 countries, and is a frequent contributor to Parameters, Parameters, Autumn 2002, “[Rolling Back Radical Islam”](http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1015395/posts%22%20%5Ct%20%22_self)”

Driven by the ferocity of events, we have begun to react militarily to the violence in Islam’s borderlands, from the Caucasus to the Philippines, as well as in that eternal frontier state, Afghanistan. And much more military engagement will be necessary in the future. But our military can address only the problems of the moment, problems rooted in yesterday. We must begin to examine the dilemmas and opportunities of each new day with greater interest, so that we may help (to the degree we can) struggling societies discover paths to a more peaceful, cooperative tomorrow. Whatever we do or fail to do, our military will be busy throughout the lifetimes of anyone reading these freshly printed lines. Success will never be final, but always a matter of degree—though, sometimes, of high degree: the difference between a bloody contest of civilizations and the routine ebb and flow of lesser conflicts. Our lack of involvement—indeed, our lack of interest—in Islam’s efforts to define its character for the 21st century and beyond has abandoned the field to our mortal enemies. Over the past few decades, Middle Eastern oil wealth has been used by the most restrictive, oppressive states to export a regressive, ferociously intolerant and anti-Western form of Islam to mosques and madrassas abroad, from the immigrant quarters of London to the back-country of Indonesia. When we noticed anything at all, we dismissed it as no more than an annoyance, our attitude drifting between the Pollyanna notion that everyone is entitled to his or her own form of religion (no matter if it preaches hatred and praises mass murder) and the “serious” policymaker’s view that religion is a tertiary issue, far less instructive and meaningful than GDP numbers or arms deals.

# Allen’s 1NR

## 2NC – Politics

### 2NC – Overview

A) Probability – Trade expansion makes all war and escalation less likely---defer negative because the DA structurally controls the case impacts

Griswold, 7 (Daniel, director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies, 4/20/2007, Trade, Democracy and Peace, HYPERLINK "<http://www.freetrade.org/node/681>" <http://www.freetrade.org/node/681>)
A little-noticed headline on an Associated Press story a while back reported, "War declining worldwide, studies say." In 2006, a survey by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute found that the number of armed conflicts around the world has been in decline for the past half-century. Since the early 1990s, ongoing conflicts have dropped from 33 to 17, with all of them now civil conflicts within countries. The Institute's latest report found that 2005 marked the second year in a row that no two nations were at war with one another. What a remarkable and wonderful fact. The death toll from war has also been falling. According to the Associated Press report, "The number killed in battle has fallen to its lowest point in the post-World War II period, dipping below 20,000 a year by one measure. Peacemaking missions, meanwhile, are growing in number." Current estimates of people killed by war are down sharply from annual tolls ranging from 40,000 to 100,000 in the 1990s, and from a peak of 700,000 in 1951 during the Korean War. Many causes lie behind the good news--the end of the Cold War and the spread of democracy, among them--but expanding trade and globalization appear to be playing a major role in promoting world peace. Far from stoking a "World on Fire," as one misguided American author argued in a forgettable book, growing commercial ties between nations have had a dampening effect on armed conflict and war. I would argue that free trade and globalization have promoted peace in three main ways. First, as I argued a moment ago, trade and globalization have reinforced the trend toward democracy, and democracies tend not to pick fights with each other. Thanks in part to globalization, almost two thirds of the world's countries today are democracies--a record high. Some studies have cast doubt on the idea that democracies are less likely to fight wars. While it's true that democracies rarely if ever war with each other, it is not such a rare occurrence for democracies to engage in wars with non-democracies. We can still hope that as more countries turn to democracy, there will be fewer provocations for war by non-democracies. A second and even more potent way that trade has promoted peace is by promoting more economic integration. As national economies become more intertwined with each other, those nations have more to lose should war break out. War in a globalized world not only means human casualties and bigger government, but also ruptured trade and investment ties that impose lasting damage on the economy. In short, globalization has dramatically raised the economic cost of war.

Interdependence solves conflict escalation

Griswold 5 (Daniel- Director of Center for Trade @ Cato Institute, “Peace on Earth? Try Free Trade among Men,” *The CATO Institute*, December 29, http://www.freetrade.org/node/282)

Buried beneath the daily stories about car bombs and insurgents is an underappreciated but comforting fact during this Christmas season: The world has somehow become a more peaceful place. As one little-noticed headline on an Associated Press story recently reported, "War declining worldwide, studies say." According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the number of armed conflicts around the world has been in decline for the past half-century. In just the past 15 years, ongoing conflicts have dropped from 33 to 18, with all of them now civil conflicts within countries. As 2005 draws to an end, no two nationsin the world are at war with each other. The death toll from war has also been falling. According to the AP story, "The number killed in battle has fallen to its lowest point in the post-World War II period, dipping below 20,000 a year by one measure. Peacemaking missions, meanwhile, are growing in number." Those estimates are down sharply from annual tolls ranging from 40,000 to 100,000 in the 1990s, and from a peak of 700,000 in 1951 during the Korean War. Many causes lie behind the good news -- the end of the Cold War and the spread of democracy, among them -- but expanding trade and globalization appear to be playing a major role. Far from stoking a "World on Fire," as one misguided American author has argued, growing commercial ties between nations have had a dampening effect on armed conflict and war, for three main reasons. First, trade and globalization have reinforced the trend toward democracy, and democracies don't pick fights with each other. Freedom to trade nurtures democracy by expanding the middle class in globalizing countries and equipping people with tools of communication such as cell phones, satellite TV, and the Internet. With trade comes more travel, more contact with people in other countries, and more exposure to new ideas. Thanks in part to globalization, almost two thirds of the world's countries today are democracies -- a record high. Second, as national economies become more integrated with each other, those nations have more to lose should war break out. War in a globalized world not only means human casualties and bigger government, but also ruptured trade and investment ties that impose lasting damage on the economy. In short, globalization has dramatically raised the economic cost of war. Third, globalization allows nations to acquire wealth through production and trade rather than conquest of territory and resources. Increasingly, wealth is measured in terms of intellectual property, financial assets, and human capital. Those are assets that cannot be seized by armies. If people need resources outside their national borders, say oil or timber or farm products, they can acquire them peacefully by trading away what they can produce best at home.

Interdependence prevents war

Gartzke 2005 (Erik, associate professor of political science at Columbia University and author of a study on economic freedom and peace contained in the 2005 Economic Freedom of the World Report, “Future Depends on Capitalizing on Capitalist Peace,” 10/18, Windsor Star, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5133>)

With terrorism achieving "global reach" and conflict raging in Africa and the Middle East, you may have missed a startling fact - we are living in remarkably peaceable times. For six decades, developed nations have not fought each other. France and the United States may chafe, but the resulting conflict pitted french fries against "freedom fries," rather than French soldiers against U.S. "freedom fighters." Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac had a nasty spat over the EU, but the English aren't going to storm Calais any time soon. The present peace is unusual. Historically, powerful nations are the most war prone. The conventional wisdom is that democracy fosters peace but this claim fails scrutiny. It is based on statistical studies that show democracies typically don't fight other democracies. Yet, the same studies show that democratic nations go to war about as much as other nations overall. And more recent research makes clear that only the affluent democracies are less likely to fight each other. Poor democracies behave much like non-democracies when it comes to war and lesser forms of conflict. A more powerful explanation is emerging from newer, and older, empirical research - the "capitalist peace." As predicted by Montesquieu, Adam Smith, Norman Angell and others, nations with high levels of economic freedom not only fight each other less, they go to war less often, period. Economic freedom is a measure of the depth of free market institutions or, put another way, of capitalism. The "democratic peace" is a mirage created by the overlap between economic and political freedom. Democracy and economic freedom typically co-exist. Thus, if economic freedom causes peace, then statistically democracy will also appear to cause peace. When democracy and economic freedom are both included in a statistical model, the results reveal that economic freedom is considerably more potent in encouraging peace than democracy, 50 times more potent, in fact, according to my own research. Economic freedom is highly statistically significant (at the one-per-cent level). Democracy does not have a measurable impact, while nations with very low levels of economic freedom are 14 times more prone to conflict than those with very high levels. But, why would free markets cause peace? Capitalism is not only an immense generator of prosperity; it is also a revolutionary source of economic, social and political change. Wealth no longer arises primarily through land or control of natural resources. New Kind of Wealth Prosperity in modern societies is created by market competition and the efficient production that arises from it. This new kind of wealth is hard for nations to "steal" through conquest. In days of old, when the English did occasionally storm Calais, nobles dreamed of wealth and power in conquered lands, while visions of booty danced in the heads of peasant soldiers. Victory in war meant new property. In a free market economy, war destroys immense wealth for victor and loser alike. Even if capital stock is restored, efficient production requires property rights and free decisions by market participants that are difficult or impossible to co-ordinate to the victor's advantage. The Iraqi war, despite Iraq's immense oil wealth, will not be a money-maker for the United States. Economic freedom is not a guarantee of peace. Other factors, like ideology or the perceived need for self-defence, can still result in violence. But, where economic freedom has taken hold, it has made war less likely. Research on the capitalist peace has profound implications in today's world. Emerging democracies, which have not stabilized the institutions of economic freedom, appear to be at least as warlike - perhaps more so - than emerging dictatorships. Yet, the United States and other western nations are putting immense resources into democratization even in nations that lack functioning free markets. This is in part based on the faulty premise of a "democratic peace." It may also in part be due to public perception. Everyone approves of democracy, but "capitalism" is often a dirty word. However, in recent decades, an increasing number of people have rediscovered the economic virtues of the "invisible hand" of free markets. We now have an additional benefit of economic freedom - international peace. The actual presence of peace in much of the world sets this era apart from others. The empirical basis for optimistic claims - about either democracy or capitalism - can be tested and refined. The way forward is to capitalize on the capitalist peace, to deepen its roots and extend it to more countries through expanding markets, development, and a common sense of international purpose. The risk today is that faulty analysis and anti-market activists may distract the developed nations from this historic opportunity.

### 2NC – ASPEC (Allen’s Idea)

Framing question – cross ex was a good filter for this – the 1AC can continually switch their agent to avoid our disad links – the exectutive means Obama gets involved – however the aff not specifying their agent mqkes them conditional – voting issue

### 2NC – Obama Pushes

The plan means Obama must be involved

**Leogrande 4/11** William M. Leogrande, professor in the department of government at American University's School of Public Affairs in Washington, D.C., 2013, “The Cuba Lobby” The most powerful lobby in Washington isn't the NRA. It's the Castro-hating right wing that has Obama's bureaucrats terrified and inert, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/11/the\_cuba\_lobby\_jay\_z?page=0,0

The Cuba Lobby's power to derail diplomatic careers is common knowledge among foreign-policy professionals. Throughout Obama's first term, midlevel State Department officials cooperated more closely and deferred more slavishly to congressional opponents of Obama's Cuba policy than to supporters like John Kerry, the new secretary of state who served at the time as Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman. When Senator Kerry tried to get the State Department and USAID to reform the Bush administration's democracy-promotion programs in 2010, he ran into more opposition from the bureaucracy than from Republicans. If Obama intends to finally keep the 2008 campaign promise to take a new direction in relations with Cuba, the job can't be left to foreign-policy bureaucrats, who are so terrified of the Cuba Lobby that they continue to believe, or pretend to believe, absurdities -- that Cubans are watching TV Martí, for instance, or that Cuba is a state sponsor of terrorism. Only a determined president and a tough secretary of state can drive a new policy through a bureaucratic wasteland so paralyzed by fear and inertia.

Political unpopularity is the reason Cuba is on the state sponsor list now

CDA 13 (Center for Democracy in the Americas, LA Times: Political calculus keeps Cuba on U.S. list of terror sponsors, <http://www.democracyinamericas.org/blog-post/la-times-political-calculus-keeps-cuba-on-u-s-list-of-terror-sponsors/>, 5/3/13)

Kayyem laments the “diluting” of the terrorist designation based on political or ideological disputes. “We work with a lot of countries we don’t like, but the imprimatur of ‘terrorism’ has a ring to it in a way that can be harmful to us,” she said. Collaboration between the United States and Cuba on emergency planning to respond to the mutual threats posed by hurricanes, oil spills and refugee crises are complicated by the set of trade and financial restrictions that comes along with the “state sponsor” censure, Kayyem said. “There are some real operational impediments when we have a system that begins with ‘no’ rather than ‘why not?’ ” she said of the legally encumbered contacts between Havana and Washington. Politicians who have pushed for a continued hard line against Cuba cheered their victory in getting the Obama administration to keep Cuba on the list. U.S. Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a South Florida Republican whose efforts to isolate and punish the Castro regime have been a central plank of her election strategy throughout her 24 years in Congress, hailed the State Department decision as “reaffirming the threat that the Castro regime represents.” Arash Aramesh, a national security analyst at Stanford Law School, blamed the continued branding of Cuba as a terrorism sponsor on politicians “pandering for a certain political base.” He also said President Obama and Secretary of State John F. Kerry have failed to make a priority of removing the impediment to better relations with Cuba.

## 2NC – PIC

### 2NC – Overview

### 2NC – Do Both

4) It’s not net beneficial- accepting the fundamental tenet of the affirmative that prescriptive action is a good thing winds up co-opting normative legal criticism

Schlag 90, professor of law@ univ. colorado, 1990 (pierre, stanford law review, november, page lexis)

Yet normative legal thought can't wait to shut down these intellectual and political openings as well. It cannot wait to envelop these inquiries in its own highly stylized ethical-moral form of norm-justification. Normative legal thought cannot wait to enlist epistemology, semiotics, social theory or any other enterprise in its own ethical-moral argument structures about the right, the good, the useful, the efficient (or any of their doctrinally crystallized derivatives). It cannot wait to reduce world views, attitudes, demonstrations, provocations, and thought itself, to norms. In short, it cannot wait to tell you (or somebody else) what to do.

### 2NC – Should

Should means an obligation or duty

AHD 92 – AHD, American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 1992 (4ed); Pg. 1612

Should—1. Used to express obligation or duty: You should send her a note.

### 2NC – Link

Extend our links from the 1NC:

Agency: they assume that it’s worthwhile to discuss questions what the so-called “USFG” “should do”- this ignores how the bureaucracy has prescripted the choices we have to discuss and that they also lack the agency to put all of this wonderfully normative advice into effect.

Rationality: the aff ascribes it to institutions that by definition lack rationality- this legitimates the bureaucracy and ignores the myriad political motivations & self interested parties necessarily entailed in all of its operations. They assume that given passage the “plan”, the USFG is able to function and respond in a benign way to act in accordance with the rational, ethical framework of the 1AC- it’s just as likely that they’d choose something else, after all, we are talking about Obama.